

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16	C/ACIS		X		
17	D/SOVA		X		
18	NIO/SP		X		
19	NIO/USSR		X		
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks This copy came from Sen Symms.

Executive Secretary

25 Jun 85

Date

STAT

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry

85- 2539

June 24, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We would like you to know that the Senate unanimously passed on June 11, 1985 an amendment to the State Department authorization bill requiring a Report to Congress on the Military Consequences of all Soviet SALT violations (enclosed). This report is long overdue, having been repeatedly requested from the Administration since March 1, 1984. We now request that this report be dealt with in the November 15, 1985 Report.

We are enclosing our own analysis of the military consequences of the Soviet SALT violations as well as our own analysis of the 1978 JCS predictions on the effects of SALT II. We hope these will be of possible use by the JCS in writing their contribution to the required report of the Defense Department. We ask these be shown to Col. Dick Toy USAF and Commander Mariner Cox USN.

We note that in your June 10, 1985 Report to Congress on Continued U.S. SALT II Compliance, the Administration stated that 'the Soviets have complied with the letter of SALT I' and that 'the Soviets have not violated the SALT I limits on ICBM and SLBM launchers.'

These statements completely contradict our 1980 and 1984 Republican Party Platform charge that there was a Carter-Mondale Administration cover-up of Soviet SALT I violations. The 1980 Republican Party Platform stated: "The Republican Party deplores the attempts of the Carter Administration to cover-up Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements... We pledge to end the Carter cover-up of Soviet violations of SALT I and II..." The 1984 Republican Party Platform repeated its condemnation of "Carter-Mondale efforts to cover-up Soviet violations of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation agreement..."

Moreover, the June 10, 1985 statements also totally contradict your own GAC Report released to Congress on October 10, 1984. The GAC Report states that Soviet deployment of the heavy SS-19 ICBM to replace the light SS-11 was a circumvention of SALT I defeating its objective and purpose. It also states that the Soviets violated SALT I by exceeding the SALT I SLBM ceiling and violated the prohibition on deliberate interference with U.S. National Technical Means of verification by their extensive camouflage, concealment and deception.

Ongoing Soviet deployment of the mobile SS-16, SS-24, and SS-25 ICBMs also defeats the object and purpose of SALT I, because it is inconsistent with the U.S. SALT I Unilateral Statement against mobile ICBM deployment.

Further, reported deployment of operational SS-25 mobile ICBMs at the Yurya old SS-7 complex violates SALT I dismantling procedures for SS-7 ICBMs.

In addition, you have confirmed that the Soviets are deploying long range SLCMs on their Stretch Yankee Class Submarine, circumventing the SALT I dismantling procedures.

In sum, there are at least 8 violations of SALT I, five of which are confirmed by Presidential Reports to Congress. Several others have been confirmed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.


Additional violations of SALT I mentioned in the press include the following:

1. Failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time, and continuous falsification of official deactivation reports between 1975 and 1982;
2. Keeping 18 SS-9 FOBS ICBMs at an ICBM test range illegally operational;
3. Violation of Brezhnev's 1972 pledge not to build mobile ICBMs;
4. Violation of Brezhnev's 1972 pledge to dismantle the entire G Class of strategic submarines;
5. Deploying SS-11 ICBMs at SS-4 and SS-5 soft sites for covert soft launch in violation of the ceiling on ICBM launchers.

We request your comments on these additional Soviet SALT I violations.

Could you please explain to us the reasons for these important contradictions of our 1980 and 1984 Republican Party Platforms and your own GAC Report as soon as possible?

Sincerely,



Enclosures

Copies to: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, JCS
Director, ACDA

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Ex. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES— _____ Cong., _____ Sess.

S. _____
H.R. _____ (or Treaty _____) SHORT TITLE

(title) _____

- () Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed
() Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

INTENDED to be proposed by MR McChure _____

Viz:

- 1 At the end of the bill add the following new section:
- 2 "The Department of Defense shall prepare a report, to be submitted
- 3 to Congress in both classified and unclassified form by July 15, 1985,
- 4 that describes in detail the direct and indirect military consequences
- 5 and effects of all Soviet violations of all arms control treaties and
- 6 agreements."
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14

February 28, 1985

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 2363

does to those New Zealanders who have not yet drifted off on cloud nine.

SALT II WAS NOT IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that two letters, one signed by myself and one by myself and my distinguished colleague, Senator JOHN P. EAST, of North Carolina, be printed in the Record.

The first letter, dated February 24, 1985, and addressed to the President, states in my name and that of Senator EAST:

It is our intention to release our letter to the Senate and to the public on March 1, 1985, and we will do so at that time unless there are any specific objections from the Executive Branch.

Mr. President, we have waited until the close of business today, February 28, 1985, to hear from the executive branch. We have received no communication in writing and no specific objections from the executive branch.

In fact, we are not aware of any executive branch objections at all. We believe we have given the executive branch ample time to review our letter.

Accordingly, we are releasing our letters in the knowledge that they are wholly unclassified, have been carefully researched in open sources, that all data given can be supported from open sources and are necessary for Senate and public debate on the unratified SALT II Treaty.

In addition, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger. This excerpt is a series of unclassified estimates of United States and Soviet strategic forces first published in 1979 during the SALT II debate. They were done by Mr. Paul Nitze, our most eminent and distinguished arms control expert, and former Director of Policy Studies for the committee.

These estimates demonstrate that our own estimates are unclassified, because our own estimates and data are in fact derived from Paul Nitze's. We have great respect for Mr. Nitze, who is now the Chief Advisor on Arms Control to our distinguished Secretary of State, George Shultz.

There being no objection, the materials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

U.S. SENATE

Washington, DC, February 24, 1985.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I believe that our attached letter is completely unclassified. It contains only data already in the public domain, and it analyzes this data to make judgments which are bounded by already unclassified and authoritative estimates.

Our letter does make reference to data originating in the Defense Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Accordingly, as a courtesy to the Executive Branch, we request that our unclassified letter be reviewed by the above agencies.

It is our intention to release our letter to the Senate and to the public on March 1, 1985, and we will do so at that time unless there are any specific objections from the Executive Branch.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

STEVE SYMMS,
U.S. Senator.

U.S. SENATE

Washington, DC, January 24, 1985.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, DC

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This is a sanitized, unclassified version of an important letter we sent to you on January 18, 1985, classified Top Secret Sensitive.

A crucial decision point approaches involving whether or not the United States should continue to comply precisely with the unratified SALT II Treaty, which last year you certified to Congress that the Soviets were violating in multiple ways. We believe that there needs to be a historical evaluation of the negative effects on American national security of U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty. We have carefully conducted such an evaluation, and we wish to make it public. In sum, we have found that there is now historical evidence that the Senate Armed Services Committee was correct in December 1979, when it concluded by overwhelming majority vote that the proposed, unequal, destabilizing SALT II Treaty "was not in the national security interest of the United States."

I. OVERALL SUMMARY

In fact, Mr. President, our analysis confirms that the Soviet Union has built up its strategic forces during the period of the 1979 SALT II Treaty through the year of 1985 to a level much higher than the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted in 1978 that the Soviets would have by the end of 1985, even if no SALT II Treaty had been signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Since 1979, Soviet Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles increased by about one fourth, and Soviet nuclear warheads more than tripled by the end of 1985. In contrast, the U.S. will have strategic forces by the end of 1985 even lower than the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted in 1978 that the U.S. would have by the end of 1985, even within SALT II constraints. In fact, U.S. forces are lower today than they were in 1979.

II. SOURCES AND ANALYTIC ASSUMPTIONS

These significant conclusions about the adverse impact on American national security, resulting from U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty are two of five conclusions we have derived from our analysis of authoritative, official, classified documents. We have carefully sanitized and declassified our analysis and conclusions. Our data is bounded by unclassified and authoritative data. Our unclassified conclusions confirm your own statement on August 18, 1980: "I cannot, however, agree to any treaty, including the SALT II Treaty, which in effect legitimizes the continuation of a one-sided arms build-up."

We have long had in our possession a classified document written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 4, 1978 describing illustrative U.S. and Soviet strategic forces through 1985, with and without a SALT II Treaty. This is an important historical document, because it was used in 1978 and 1979 in the U.S. decision-making and negotiating

on SALT II. Using the sanitized general conclusions of this document, we can now in 1985 evaluate retrospectively how accurate U.S. intelligence and planning assumptions were in 1978, and make an overall assessment of the actual national security effects of SALT II from a historical perspective. A sanitized extract of general conclusions from this JCS document is Attachment A.

We also have various classified Defense Intelligence Agency estimates of Soviet strategic force structures, and classified Defense Department tabulations of U.S. strategic force programs. Our sanitized and declassified chart based upon our classified DIA and DoD sources are Attachment B.

We recognize that our estimate of Soviet forces at the end of 1985 is somewhat higher than agreed Executive Branch National Intelligence Estimates. This is largely because we have tried to take account of certain of the military effects of some of the Soviet SALT II violations. Regrettably, we have still not received the Executive Branch's assessment of the military implications of Soviet SALT II violations which we requested last March 1, 1984. Accordingly, we have done our own assessment, which we believe to be reasonable, and while soundly based on classified sources, wholly sanitized and unclassified.

Several assumptions underlying our estimate chart should be specified at the outset. First and most significantly, we are counting up to about 400 Backfire bombers and their weapons in the Soviet force totals for the end of 1985. We believe this is completely reasonable. In 1979, General Rowny testified that the Soviets would have about 400 Backfire bombers by the end of 1985, and you yourself stated in the nationally televised debate on October 30, 1980:

"SALT II is illegal, because the law of the land, passed by Congress, says we cannot accept a treaty in which we are not equal, and we're not equal in this treaty for one reason alone: our B-52 bombers are considered to be strategic weapons; their Backfire bombers are not."

This is a strong indication that the Reagan Administration should count the Soviet Backfire bomber in its SALT II force estimates, as well as in our START and "umbrella talks" proposals. The reason that you wanted to count Backfire as an intercontinental bomber in 1980 is that U.S. Intelligence agreed that it had intercontinental range and refueling capabilities. The 1981 first edition of Soviet Military Power states on page 63 that the range of the Backfire bomber is in excess of 8,900 kilometers, and on page 62 it states that the range of the Bison bomber is only 8,000 kilometers. The Bison counts as an intercontinental bomber in SALT II, and the longer ranged Backfire should therefore also count. (Backfire also has longer range than some variants of the U.S. B-52 bomber, all of which count in SALT II.) Further, the Soviets tried to deceive the U.S. on whether the Backfire was an intercontinental bomber, despite its intercontinental range and refueling capabilities, another reason for counting it in SALT II. The strategic significance of counting Backfire in SALT II is that this force alone can deliver about 30 per cent of the huge Soviet megatonnage advantage, making Backfire a formidable second strike force.

Second, we are counting in Soviet forces at the end of 1985 at least 100 SS-16 mobile ICBM launchers, because on January 23, 1984, you informed Congress that the mobile SS-16 ICBM is "probably deployed" operationally. Open sources indicate that the Soviets have probably deployed over 100 SS-16s.

S 2364

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 28, 1985

Third, as required by Article VI 1 of the SALT II Treaty itself, we are counting at the end of 1985 those Soviet Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) "in the final stage of construction" and "undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization or conversion." There are press reports of impending silo and mobile deployment of the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs. And there are authoritative unclassified reports that the SS-24 and SS-25 are in pre-series production (*Soviet Military Power*, 1984, p. 98). We have estimated a modest force of about 100 of these by late 1985.

Finally, we have used the maximum reported warhead capacities demonstrated for MIRVed Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs, because we believe that this is the only rational way to measure the real Soviet threat. It should be noted, however, that we are not counting large numbers of refire and stockpiled ICBMs and SLBMs, additional strategic submarines under construction, and many additional long range bombers not functionally distinguishable from SALT-accountable Soviet bombers. We are also ignoring Soviet strategic SLCMs, where they hold a huge advantage, and GLCMs. Hence, our estimates do in fact significantly underestimate the full Soviet threat.

Comparing the sanitized JCS chart with the sanitized DIA/DoD chart (attached), we have reached the following summary conclusions expressed in tabular and in percentage statement format:

III. SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF SALT II ON UNITED STATES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES AS PREDICTED BY THE JCS IN 1978

Note on declassification: These estimates are rounded off. Using reasonable assumptions and available unclassified data, Paul Nitze's unclassified 1979 estimates published in 1984 (See Attachment C) provide both lower and upper bounds on Soviet force levels. U.S. force levels for 1985 have been officially published without classification.

	SNDVs ¹	Warheads
1975-1979		
U.S. Forces	2,053	9,700
Soviet Forces (Paul Nitze's estimate, as adjusted for improper MIRV counting)	2,504	4,500
Maximum estimated in 1978 for 1985, within SALT II		
U.S. Forces	about 2,000	About 14,000
Soviet Forces	2,505	About 8,500
Maximum estimated in 1978 for 1985, no SALT II		
U.S. Forces	About 2,500	About 18,000
Soviet Forces	About 3,000	About 11,000
Estimated end of 1985		
U.S. Forces	About 2,000	9,300
Soviet Forces	About 3,200	About 15,700
Paul Nitze's 1975 estimate of Soviet Forces in 1985 assuming SALT II compliance	(SNDVs's 2,246)	(Warheads 11,728)
Include 400 intercontinental Backfire bombers with 3 ALCM's each	2,645	12,578
Include 300 new ICBM launches new bomber, probe and maximum MIRV loadings	3,292	17,182

¹ SNDV = Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle.

SUMMARY STATEMENTS

(Note.—These calculations are approximate.)

1. In 1978, the JCS estimated that Soviet SNDVs would decrease by over about 10% with SALT II, and increase by about 15% without SALT II by the end of 1985. In actuality, Soviet SNDVs probably increased by about 25% by the end of 1985.

2. In 1978, the JCS estimated that Soviet warheads would increase by roughly over 90% with SALT II, and increase by over 150% without SALT II by the end of 1985. In actuality, Soviet warheads probably increased by over 200% by the end of 1985. This is our most important conclusion.

3. In 1978, the JCS estimated that U.S. SNDVs would increase by 2% with SALT II, and increase by about 18% without SALT II by the end of 1985. In actuality, U.S. SNDVs decreased by about 9% by the end of 1985.

4. In 1978, the JCS estimated that U.S. warheads would increase by 51% with SALT II, and increase by about 95% without SALT II by the end of 1985. In actuality, U.S. warheads remained almost constant, rising by only about 2%.

In sum, during the 1979-1985 period of SALT II, Soviet SNDVs increased by about one fourth, but the warheads carried tripled through Soviet exploitation of their huge throw-weight advantage by MIRVing and ALCM loading. Our summary conclusions are fully consistent with Defense Secretary Weinberger's statement in the Washington Times on December 20, 1984:

"Improvements and additions to the Soviet missile force continue at a frightening pace, even though we have added SALT II restraints on top of SALT I agreements. The Soviet Union has built more of the big nuclear warheads capable of destroying U.S. missiles in their concrete silos than we had initially predicted they would build, even without any SALT agreement. We now confront precisely the situation that the SALT process was intended to prevent."

IV. DETAILED CONCLUSIONS

We would now present five more detailed conclusions derived from a careful comparison of the sanitized 1978 JCS chart and our sanitized DIA/DoD chart for late 1985. First, we estimate that by the end of 1985, when the unratified SALT II Treaty is due to expire, the Soviets will have about 3,200 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, carrying about 15,200 warheads. But the 1978 JCS chart reveals that the JCS estimated that the highest force levels that the Soviets could achieve by the end of 1985, in the absence of the SALT II Treaty, was about 3,000 SNDVs carrying about 11,000 warheads.

The JCS in 1978 were evidently relying upon CIA estimates of Soviet forces for 1985 unconstrained by SALT II. These CIA estimates, however, will turn out to significantly underestimate the force levels the Soviet will probably have achieved by late 1985. As we know, the CIA significantly underestimated Soviet strategic forces throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.

Comparing the sanitized JCS chart to our sanitized 1985 estimate chart, we find that the Soviets will probably be about 200 SNDVs and about 2,000 warheads above the highest levels that the JCS in 1978 estimated for the Soviets at the end of 1985 without a SALT II Treaty. We believe a new Team B critique of CIA estimates is needed, because the 1976 competitive estimates evidently did not improve the accuracy of CIA estimates.

This is the clearest evidence yet that the Soviets did not allow their strategic programs to be affected in any way by SALT II, and that since 1979 they have been "Breaking Out" of SALT II. We recall that there is strong classified evidence that the SALT I interim Agreement of 1972 similarly did not affect the Soviet ICBM and SLBM deployment plans throughout the 1970s. But some of this evidence was long suppressed within the Intelligence Community, and the analysis is not widely known. We call your attention to the June, 1978 CIA study entitled *The Soviet Strategic Planning Process And SALT* (title unclassified, study classified Top Secret Codeword Sensitive). This document has been made available to us, and should be studied by the entire Senate. We urge you to become familiar with it as well.

This study also indicates that the late Soviet President Brezhnev himself negotiat-

ed deceptively in order to protect Soviet programs from constraint, while at the same time misleading the U.S. into believing that SALT I would constrain Soviet programs. We have been informed that there is testimony to the Senate to the effect that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Congress were not aware in 1972 of this evidence of Soviet intentions to deploy prohibited systems fully in the face of SALT I constraints. The Senate Intelligence Committee confirmed in late 1979 that key evidence on Soviet compliance intentions had in fact been suppressed. Consequently, we believe it reasonable to conclude that the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement were ratified and approved in August and September 1972 under the false pretense that SALT I would actually constrain Soviet programs.

Second, on the basis of our sanitized JCS and DIA/DoD charts, we have compared the U.S. aggregate of 2,000/9,300 at the end of 1985 to the maximum force level predicted by the JCS in 1978 for the U.S. in 1985 in the absence of SALT II. This U.S. 1985 non-SALT II aggregate is 2,500/18,000.

By complying unilaterally with and unratified SALT II Treaty which you have certified the Soviets have violated in four ways, the U.S. therefore forfeited potential deployment over the six years of SALT II of about 500 SNDVs carrying about 8,700 warheads. This is a measure of the security costs of our unilateral compliance and de facto unilateral disarmament and appeasement. These 500 SNDVs carrying 8,700 warheads could have bolstered deterrence and mitigated the Soviet buildup.

Third, it is interesting to compare these U.S. forfeitures through SALT II compliance with the force levels the Soviets will probably achieve by the end of 1985 by SALT II Breakout. Considering the highest SNDV/warhead aggregate that the JCS projected in 1978 for the Soviets by the end of 1985 within SALT II constraints, the Soviets have added about 950 SNDVs and about 4,700 warheads above those levels. Thus the Soviets are much higher than estimated even if they were adhering to SALT II. Moreover, the Soviet increment above SALT II ceilings is comparable to the increment the U.S. forfeited by agreeing to comply unilaterally with the unratified SALT II Treaty.

Fourth, considering SNDV/warhead levels estimated for the Soviets by the JCS as of 1978, the Soviets will have added about 700 SNDVs carrying about 8,700 warheads during the 1978-79-1985 period of SALT II. This is a very significant increase in the threat to America. To repeat, the Soviets increased their SNDVs by a fourth, and tripled their warheads. As you stated in your January 9, 1985 press conference, "SALT II is nothing but a limitation on how fast you increase weapons."

Fifth, the Carter era JCS under General Davy Jones planned to retain all U.S. Titan II ICBMs and B-52D bombers in the U.S. SNDV aggregate through 1985 under SALT II. But in addition to the above noted U.S. forfeiture under SALT II of 500 SNDVs carrying 8,700 warheads, the JCS under the Reagan Administration will have unilaterally scrapped almost all of the Titan II and B-52D systems by the end of 1985, and in addition, all 160 Polaris SLBMs, for a total of 292/500 SNDVs/warheads the U.S. has unilaterally deactivated during U.S. unilateral SALT II compliance. Moreover, the Carter JCS planned 250 MX ICBMs which were to be survivable, and you plan only 100 vulnerable MX. In total, 672 SNDVs existing or planned carrying 6,800 warheads have been

unilaterally scrapped under the Reagan Administration.

V. RESTATEMENT

In sum, the Soviet strategic build-up from 1978 through 1985 occurred ostensibly within SALT II, but was in fact much greater than that projected for the Soviets without SALT II. Our conclusion confirms Secretary of Defense Weinberger's statement in the FY 1985 Defense Posture Statement: "The SALT II Agreement would have codified that unilateral Soviet buildup and allowed additional growth in Soviet forces, thereby permitting even further deterioration of the military balance."

The Soviets seem to believe that SALT is a zero sum game, with them as the winners and the U.S. as the losers. A Soviet foreign policy expert, speaking for the Kremlin leadership, wrote in 1979:

"Signing the (SALT II) Interim Agreement (was a) victory of the Soviet Union in the arms race ... (the) 1972 Moscow Agreement, like the Vladivostok Agreement, noted the defeat of the American strategic arms race policy." (Stanislav Tumkovsky Problems of History, Moscow, 1979)

Because the 1974 Vladivostok Agreement was the basis for the SALT II Treaty and was incorporated into SALT II, the Soviets evidently believe that both SALT I and SALT II were victories for the Soviet Union and defeats for the United States.

Finally, although we recognize and fully support the need to protect intelligence sources and methods and defense information about our own forces, we also believe that it is imperative for the American people to have a general understanding of the massive increase in Soviet nuclear arms that has occurred during the period of alleged Soviet adherence to SALT II, and that they know also the enormous advantages which the U.S. has denied itself through a policy of vacillation based on strict unilateral compliance with an unratified treaty our opponents are known to be violating at will. Continued silence on these matters is intolerable. That is why we have sanitized and declassified our analysis and conclusions. The adverse strategic balance entails both political and military risks. As relative Soviet power continues to increase, the Soviets fully expect the U.S. and its allies to move increasingly toward accommodation and appeasement.

VI. REQUESTS

In conclusion, we have several questions and requests. First, we ask whether you and your national security departments and agencies are as concerned about our analysis and conclusions as we are? We request their comments. Second, we request that you consider our analysis, conclusions and attached charts and amendments in your forthcoming decision about whether to continue U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty. Third, we request that your Administration prepare witnesses to send to hearings on the Constitutional aspects of the treaty-making powers as applied to arms control. We are considering holding such hearings. Finally, we also intend to seek another Senate vote on the merits of continued U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty (See Attachments).

We want to support your defense budget request and your strategic modernization program, including MX, but but only in the context of U.S. disavowal of unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty which you have already confirmed the Soviets

are violating in multiple ways. We are extremely concerned that the Soviets have built up their strategic forces during the period of SALT II through late 1985 to a much higher level than we thought they would even without SALT II.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

STEVE SYMMS,

U.S. Senator.

JOHN EAST,

U.S. Senator.

A. Maximum U.S.-Soviet Strategic Forces, 1985, Within And Outside SALT II Treaty Ceilings, as predicted by JCS in January 1978:

	U.S. Forces within SALT II	Soviet Forces within SALT II, 1985	U.S. Forces outside SALT II	Soviet Forces outside SALT II, 1985
SDNY's	about 2,000	2,250	about 2,500	about 1,000
Warheads	about 14,000	about 8,500	about 18,000	about 11,000

Note: All numbers are rounded off for sanitization of classified data. All Soviet forces are within the bounds of Paul Nitze's published estimates, with Backfire, non-deactivated forces, and proper force loading assumed.

B. U.S.-Soviet Strategic Forces, Estimated for Late 1985:

	U.S. Forces	Soviet Forces
SDNY's	about 2,000	about 3,200
Warheads	about 9,300	about 11,728

* These totals understate the true Soviet threat, because recent, retired, and stockpiled ICBM's are not counted, additional SLBM's are under construction but not confirmed, and bombers without FRODS are ignored.

* Counts up to 400 intercontinental Backfire bombers with 3 ALCM's each, 100 mobile SS-16 ICBM's, final stages of construction, conversion and modernization, 100 SS-24 and SS-25 ICBM's, maximum demonstrated ICBM and SLBM MIRV loadings.

Note: All numbers are rounded off for sanitization of classified data. Estimated Soviet 1985 warheads are below Paul Nitze's 1985 warhead estimates, if Backfire and non-deactivated forces are added and properly loaded.

C. U.S.-Soviet Strategic Forces, 1979 and 1985, within SALT II Treaty Ceilings, Committee on the Present Danger, 8 November 1979, as prepared by Paul Nitze.

	June 18, 1979		End of 1985	
	U.S. strategic forces	Soviet strategic forces	U.S. strategic forces	Soviet strategic forces
Total SDNY's	2,053	2,504	2,130	2,246
Total warheads	9,514	8,276	12,504	11,728

* Excludes Backfire and its weapons. Counts MIRV's incorrectly as independent warheads.

Source: Alerting America, The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger, Ed. by Charles Tyroler, Pergamon-Brassery, Washington, 1984, pp. 113-154.

	Total Soviet SDNY's / warheads
Non-SALT II Compliance Forces:	
Includes 400 Backfire bombers with 2 ALCM's each	2,646 / 12,328
Includes 254 missiles and bombers not deactivated	2,800 / 11,542
Includes 300 new ICBM launchers, proper and maximum MIRV loadings, new bomber	1,792 / 17,188

FURTHER UNCLASSIFIED DATA SUPPORTING OUR CONCLUSIONS

1. Robert McFarlane stated in a recent public speech at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco that since 1975 the Soviets had constructed "more than 10,800 additional nuclear weapons." This would give the Soviets 13,540 warheads in 1985, which is above our estimate.

2. As Paul Nitze accurately predicted publicly on March 14, 1979: "During the span of the (SALT II) agreement, numbers of nuclear warheads can be expected to rise by 300

percent on the Soviet side, in comparison to about 50 percent for the U.S."

This is above our estimates.

3. As Paul Nitze accurately predicted publicly on October 1, 1979: "If the SALT II Treaty were to approach expiration in 1985 without replacement and without a survivable and durable U.S. ICBM component, the U.S. could face unprecedented dangers. We would then have to take seriously both the then-existing degree of Soviet nuclear strategic superiority, and Soviet superiority in break-out potential."

4. Further, Paul Nitze again accurately predicted Soviet forces publicly on May 16, 1979: "From the beginning of 1978 to the end of 1985, the number of Soviet warheads will have doubled; ours will have increased by half ... the capability of their weapons to knock out hardened targets, such as missile silos, will have increased tenfold ... by the end of 1985, under the limits of SALT II, (U.S. prompt counter force hard target capability) will be an eighth of that of the Soviet Union ... This will be compounded by the fact that they will have twice as many hard targets as we, and their targets will be, on average, twice as hard as ours."

This is the same as our estimate.

Nitze added ominously: "A more sober evaluation of the balance, at a time when it is too late to reverse trends, could result in forced accommodation to the Soviet Union leading to a situation of global retreat and Finlandization."

5. As Nitze again accurately predicted publicly on May 16, 1979: "Under SALT II ... the capability of Soviet missiles to destroy hardened military targets is expected to rise by 1,000 percent."

AMENDMENT

Add at the end of the bill the following new section:

"Sec. — Notwithstanding any other provision of law or of this Act, no national security program of the United States shall be terminated, impeded, or delayed in order to comply with any provision of the unratified SALT II Treaty, unless and until the President shall have certified to Congress that the Soviet Union is in full compliance with SALT II."

AMENDMENT

Add at the end of the bill the following new section:

"Sec. — Notwithstanding any other provision of law or of this Act, no funds authorized or appropriated by this or any other Act may be obligated or expended to deactivate or remove from operational service any Minuteman ICBM or any Poseidon missile or missile submarine for any purpose including specifically that of complying with any provision of the unratified SALT II Treaty, unless the President shall have certified to Congress prior to any such deactivation or removal from service that the Soviet Union is in full compliance with SALT II."

ALERTING AMERICA

(Edited by Charles Tyroler II, Introduction by Max M. Kampelman)

APPENDIX

The following charts and graphs were prepared by Paul H. Nitze and distributed as appendices to the above statement.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 13

(Prepared by Paul H. Nitze, 1 November 1977-8 November 1979)

S 7670

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1984

from coming into this country to rob the minds of our youth.

All of that is being held hostage, Mr. President, in this legislation.

So I just want the President and my colleagues in the Senate to know that when this matter, House Joint Resolution 492, comes up next Monday, this Senator will move that we recede from our item in disagreement with the House, the \$21 million in covert assistance for the Contras in Nicaragua. I want to make that clear to my colleagues, because it is the only way we will obtain this legislation in time for the summer youth employment programs in America, the nutritional programs for the feeding of our infants and mothers in this country, to answer the needs of hungry folks in Africa who are suffering through the worst drought in many decades in that impoverished area.

I am sorry we are going to do this on a Monday. I hope that my friends and colleagues will hear the sound of my voice and will come here next Monday, a day when our attendance is notoriously rather small from time to time, because I think this is a fundamentally important issue.

I hope that every Member of the Senate will rise above party and think of this great country of ours and cast his or her vote with the sense of responsibility and integrity of purpose that every Senator always should employ.

I say to my friends in the Senate that we should send this conference report back to the House, concurring in all the 22 items in agreement, or in technical disagreement, and dropping the one item of disagreement, the \$21 million in covert assistance to Nicaragua.

I have talked to many Members of the House, and there are none who believe there is any possibility that these funds can survive and that this legislation can survive if the 22 items of importance to the country are held hostage to that covert assistance question.

Mr. President, I think the minority leader for the interest he has shown in this matter. I thank the majority leader. He is a fine man, a considerate and fair man, who has bent over backward to accommodate this Senator. But the administration is in error in persisting in trying to hold this hostage to that one question, which we have thoroughly debated here.

I put the Senate on notice that next Monday we will urgently request our colleagues to do the right thing, the responsible thing, to pass this measure without the item of disagreement that cannot possibly survive in the hands of the House.

ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business until 11:45 a.m., with

statements therein limited to 2 minutes each.

SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY VIOLATIONS

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, today we live in a very dangerous world. The Soviet Union is violating every major arms control agreement in force today.

These Soviet arms control violations have paid very handsome dividends for the Soviets. They have allowed the Soviets to gain overall strategic superiority in both offensive and defensive capabilities. In fact, according to Defense Secretary Weinberger, the Soviets have stepped up their own strategic modernization program.

Using only the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) counting rules, the Soviets now have an overwhelming 6-to-1 strategic offensive superiority over the United States, a true first-strike potential so long feared by our strategists. The Soviets are 10 years ahead of the United States in strategic offensive capabilities. This Soviet first-strike potential grows ever more ominous each year, and its utility for political blackmail and intimidation is even more apparent. The Soviet advantages derived from their SALT cheating are even greater. The Soviet first-strike capability throws an ever-darkening shadow over all the world's politics, and is a direct result of the Soviet violations of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT).

And now we have recent revelations from defense officials that the Soviet Union is also 10 years ahead of the United States in defensive antiballistic missile capability, and may in just a year's time be able to defend over one-third—a significant proportion—of both its population and its offensive forces from the U.S. retaliatory deterrent. The Soviets may also at any time launch the first laser antiballistic missile battle station into space, where they already have had an operational antisatellite capability for over a decade.

These Soviet offensive and defensive advantages threaten the credibility of the U.S. retaliatory deterrent, which has preserved the world's peace for 38 years. If the Soviets can threaten a devastating first strike, and then also threaten to defend against a significant part of the U.S. retaliatory response, deterrence is gravely weakened. Peace could be in jeopardy, and the United States is not only vulnerable to Soviet first strike, but more importantly, because of this vulnerability, we are increasingly subject to Soviet attempts at intimidation through nuclear blackmail.

President Reagan stated in a press conference on March 31, 1982:

The Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority enough so that there is risk, and that is what I have called a window of vulnerability.

President Reagan also stated on March 23, 1983:

The Soviets have enough accurate and powerful nuclear weapons to destroy virtually all of our missiles on the ground.

President Reagan then added that the Soviets have a "present margin of superiority."

The Soviet Defense Minister, the late Marshal Grechko, stated openly as long ago as March 1975:

The correlation of forces (i.e., the strategic nuclear balance) has changed in favor of socialism and to the detriment of imperialism.

A Soviet military journal, *Red Star*, stated threateningly in January 1980:

With respect to the military balance, the correlation of forces has shifted once and for all and irrevocably.

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff conceded ominously in their military posture statement to Congress for fiscal year 1985:

The Soviets have now developed strategic offensive and defensive capabilities that erode the credibility of the U.S. deterrent and increase the risk that Soviet leaders would consider launching a surprise nuclear attack. (Italic added.)

The JCS concedes that "the Soviets hold a distinct advantage in terms of total numbers of strategic offensive forces," and that "Soviet strategic forces are more effective than those of the United States." The JCS have also conceded that the Soviets have a "survivable superior offensive capability."

The U.S. Air Force has stated officially to Congress that there is "a destabilizing imbalance between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces."

Defense Secretary Weinberger stated to the Senate on May 24, 1984:

The Soviet military buildup, both quantitative and qualitative, has produced a major shift in the nuclear and conventional balance.

Secretary of State Shultz stated on May 14, 1984: "Arms control will simply not survive in conditions of inequality."

America's strategic decline that not even bottomed out yet. Our military leaders have been telling us for several years that even after all our currently planned strategic offensive modernization programs are deployed by 1990, we will still not be able to regain strategic offensive parity with the Soviets, and this assumes that Congress will fund them. Thus we are over 10 years behind the Soviets in strategic offensive capability. If we are also 10 years behind in ABM's and space lasers and antisatellites as well, then it is an urgent national security priority to bolster deterrence and to quickly acquire defenses.

The role of the false doctrine of arms control in speeding and assuring the U.S. strategic decline needs at long last to be carefully examined. The historical evidence indicates that arms control has been used as an instrument in the Soviet game plan for strategic supremacy. As President Reagan has pointed out, our strategic nuclear

June 20, 1984

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

megatonnage is now only one quarter of what it was in 1965, and the number of U.S. nuclear warheads has declined by one-third of what it was in 1965. Arms control has unilaterally restrained U.S. strategic programs, while allowing all Soviet strategic programs to progress unhindered. In a real sense, arms control has been an enormous Soviet strategic deception, and a very successful deception indeed. In contrast, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that "The Soviets have increased their strategic warheads more than threefold since 1973." Actually, Soviet warheads have increased over fourfold since 1973. The April 1984 edition of the DOD's Soviet Military Power also states that "with the [Soviet] deployment of new nuclear weapons systems their stockpile megatonnage has again started to rise."

Mr. President, the relentless momentum of the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons buildup, which started before 1962, is destined to continue into the 1990's and beyond. This Soviet strategic buildup, unprecedented in history, has not been constrained by existing strategic arms limitation treaties. The Defense Department has testified to Congress recently that "this Soviet buildup of strategic nuclear forces shows no sign of slowing." The Defense Department added that "we see no letup in the rate of deployment of Soviet [strategic] systems over the next ten years."

As Dr. Eugene Rostow, former Reagan administration Arms Control Director, has written about the first SALT agreements of 1972 and the decade of the 1970's culminating in SALT II in 1979:

The SALT I Agreements and the process of negotiating SALT II did not prevent the worst decade of the Cold War or the extraordinary build-up of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

And Dr. Richard DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development in the Reagan Defense Department, has testified to Congress: The Soviets in fact never slowed or even perturbed their strategic development and deployment programs in spite of détente, active arms control negotiations, or the SALT Agreements.

Mr. President, Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle recently testified to Congress that there has been almost a 75-percent increase in Soviet nuclear warheads aimed at the United States since the SALT II Treaty was signed in 1979. Perle added that the Soviets have deployed 3,850 ballistic missile warheads since 1979, and this does not even count refinements. This means that the Soviets have almost doubled their nuclear warheads aimed at us since former President Carter's SALT II Treaty was signed.

Using only SALT counting rules, the Soviets now have over 895 more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than the United States and over 1,000 more warheads than the United States. And

this does not even count the effects of their SALT violations. The strategic impact of their SALT violations gives the Soviets a force an order of magnitude larger. The Soviets also have over 30 strategic offensive programs under development for future deployment. Thus, SALT II did not stabilize the strategic balance. It did just the opposite.

But in stark contrast, since 1980, the Reagan administration has gone in just the opposite direction from the Soviets. The Reagan administration has unilaterally deactivated over 292 strategic delivery vehicles, carrying over 500 warheads counted in the SALT II Treaty. The United States has thus deactivated gratuitously over 33 percent of existing American strategic megatonnage.

Indeed, the Reagan administration plans to continue these unilateral deactivations in unilateral U.S. compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty by dismantling two Poseidon submarines carrying 32 SLBM's and 320 warheads, and 90 B-52G's carrying over 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles. The Reagan administration has also significantly reduced the MX ICBM program and the B-1B bomber program, by one-half and two-thirds, respectively, below previously planned deployment levels. And the Reagan administration plans to completely cancel the only two U.S. strategic offensive systems now being produced for operational deployment: the ALCM-B and the Trident I SLBM. This Reagan strategic cutback is part of a larger trend in declining U.S. strategic capability. As I have noted, since 1965, the number of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads has declined by one-third, and their megatonnage by three-quarters. Thus the United States has been exercising unilateral restraint for almost 20 years.

A top Reagan defense official recently stated to the Senate that:

The President's Strategic Modernization Program won't match the Soviet buildup that first became visible twelve years ago after we signed the SALT I agreements. (Emphasis added.)

This statement seems to mean that even President Reagan has conceded strategic superiority to the Soviets after 1990.

The Secretary of Defense stated to Senators on April 5, 1984, that he is "deeply concerned" about the military implications of the Soviet SALT violations. He added that "Far more serious are the implications for the overall defense posture of the United States relative to that of the Soviet Union." Caspar Weinberger was thus likewise implying that Soviet SALT violations are another sign that the United States has conceded strategic superiority to the Soviets. This conclusion is strengthened by Weinberger's added judgment that:

Some possible outcomes of an effective [Soviet] ABM system or a new mobile ICBM could provide the Soviets with a decisive

edge in strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. (Emphasis added.)

This statement suggests also that the developing Soviet strategic superiority will soon be "decisive," because the Soviets are indeed developing an effective ABM and a new mobile ICBM both of which will be operational before the late 1980's.

As a top Nixon administration arms control official wrote as long ago as 1971:

If, after a reasonable period, SALT negotiations prove unproductive, or if the U.S.S.R. resumes land-based ICBM deployments or moves to modernize or expand its Moscow ABM system, the United States would take whatever steps are necessary to maintain its strategic deterrent, including possible deployment of a more advanced Hard Site Defense (HSD defense of land-based ICBMs). (Emphasis added.)

Unfortunately, all these conditions set in 1971 are now being met. Strategic arms treaties and negotiations are broken; the Soviets are deploying land mobile ICBM's, expanding and modernizing their ABM, and yet the United States is doing very little to maintain its strategic deterrent.

As Defense Secretary Weinberger has stated to Congress:

Unilateral Soviet deployment of an advanced system capable of countering Western ballistic missiles—added to the Soviets already impressive air and other defense capabilities—would have major, adverse consequences for deterrent stability and for the security of the United States and its allies.

Juxtaposed against this ominous statement are the following judgments for the April 1984 edition of the DOD's Soviet Military Power:

The U.S.S.R. has an improving potential for large-scale deployment of modernized ABM defenses well beyond the 100 launcher ABM treaty limits. The Soviets have developed a rapidly deployable ABM system (i.e., the ABM-3I for which sites could be built in months instead of years). The new, large, phased-array radars under construction in the U.S.S.R. along with the Hen House, Dog House, Cat House, and possibly the Pushkino radars appear to be designed to provide support for such a widespread ABM defense system.

The complete network (i.e., over 25) of these radars, which could provide target tracking data for ABM deployments beyond Moscow, probably will be operational by the late 1980s.

Both the SA-10 and SA-X-12 may have the potential to intercept some types of U.S. strategic ballistic missiles as well (i.e., the mobile version of the SAM-10 will be operational by 1985. The mobile SAM-12 will probably also be operational by 1985.) These systems could, if properly supported, add significant point-target coverage to a widespread ABM deployment.

The Soviets seem to have placed themselves in a position to field relatively quickly a nationwide ABM system, should they decide to do so. (Emphasis added.)

Thus it is fair to conclude, from official testimony, that the Soviets have already seriously eroded the U.S. deterrent capability with their ever-growing ABM capability.

S 7672

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1984

As Drs. Colin Gray and Keith Payne stated in the spring 1984 issue of *Foreign Affairs*:

A unilateral Soviet BMD System of even limited effectiveness could be highly destabilizing in the context of existing Soviet offensive first-strike capabilities and extensive air defense and civil defense preparations. The U.S. deterrent threat could be severely degraded by the combination of the Soviet first-strike potential to destroy American strategic nuclear forces and a Soviet defense against surviving American forces.

This is the situation today. Soviet strategic defensive activities were roughly five times U.S. outlays in 1970 and increased to 25 times U.S. outlays in 1979.

In effect the ABM treaty provided Soviet SS-18's and SS-19's unimpeded access to U.S. ICBM silos.

As Senator Tower, chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee and the Senate Committee on Armed Services stated on April 3, 1984:

The military imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union still exists as a threat to our national security. Although significant progress has been made in the last three years to regain military parity with the Soviet Union, congressionally mandated reductions in the President's defense plan have seriously impaired efforts to achieve this goal. In fact, the current imbalance will continue to widen, though at a lesser rate. (Emphasis added.)

As the Scowcroft Commission report to President Reagan on strategic forces stated in April 1983: "... effective deterrence is in no small measure a question of the Soviets' perception of our national will and cohesion."

President Reagan himself has on two occasions in 1982 and 1983 publicly and explicitly accused the Soviet Union of violating the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement which ended the Cuban missile crisis, the most dangerous nuclear crisis in world history.

This agreement was supposed to "halt further introduction of such weapons systems—that is, Soviet offensive missiles and other offensive weapons, which Khrushchev even defined as including Soviet troops—into Cuba as firm undertakings" on the part of both the United States and the Soviet governments.

President Reagan stated at a press conference in May, 1982:

You know, there's been other things we think are violations also of the 1962 agreement.

There is conclusive physical evidence of Soviet military activity in Cuba in violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement.

THE SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS AND CUBA

Mr. President, I would like to discuss today the full spectrum of Soviet violations of arms control agreements. As my colleagues know, I have been concerned about Soviet arms control violations and their implications for American national security since 1982. Our distinguished colleague, Senator JIM McCLELLAN, made his first speech this problem back in 1975. Senator

McCLELLAN successfully sponsored an amendment in 1977 designed to prevent extended U.S. compliance with the expired SALT I interim agreement from hindering our strategic options, and both Senator McCLELLAN and I have been leading opponents of the unequal and destabilizing SALT II Treaty.

Mr. President, while Soviet SALT violations are dangerous, this danger is overshadowed by another even more ominous development. The Soviets are deploying nuclear weapons delivery capable offensive systems to Cuba, such as TU-95 Bear bombers, Mig-27 Flogger fighter-bombers, and strategic submarines like the Victor III class reported to be equipped with long-range cruise missiles. The Soviets also have nuclear warhead storage facilities in Cuba, and the United States is reportedly unable to rule out the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons themselves in Cuba.

On September 14, 1983, President Reagan repeated his accusation. He stated:

As far as I'm concerned, that agreement has been abrogated many times by the Soviet Union and Cuba in the bringing of what can only be considered offensive weapons, not defensive, there.

The President's two statements have been backed up by stronger statements by the CIA Director, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by an Under Secretary of Defense.

As I said, Mr. President, the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement was the agreement that ended the Cuban missile crisis, and it can be regarded as an arms control agreement because it ostensibly forbade Soviet offensive missiles and bombers in Cuba and it entailed United Nations onsite inspection against Soviet reintroduction of such weapons. But of course the Castro regime refused to agree to U.N. onsite inspection, and since 1969 many Soviet offensive nuclear delivery capable weapons have been gradually returned to Cuba. Thus the Soviet threat from Cuba is today greater than it was in 1962, as can be inferred from the Soviet activities and President Reagan's statements. This fact suggests that we may soon find ourselves back in a Cuban missile crisis situation, but now we are much weaker than the Soviet Union and the danger may be even greater for U.S. national security interests.

The State Department has stated recently to the Senate that:

The basing of any nuclear-armed submarine in Cuba would contravene the U.S.-U.S.S.R. understanding on Cuba. The Soviets are aware of this. (Emphasis added.)

Thus the State Department must surely consider the acknowledged Soviet basing of Golf and Echo class nuclear armed missile submarines in Cuba in 1970, 1972, 1973, and 1974 to be Soviet violations of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. The State Department has therefore confirmed Soviet violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement.

The State Department has also stated recently to the Senate that:

The Department of State does agree with the President and the other officials... that the Soviet Union has on occasion violated the spirit of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding.

The State Department has also recently conceded that:

All Soviet tactical aircraft in Eastern Europe, including Floggers are rated as potential nuclear delivery systems.

Some top Reagan administration officials are predicting that the Soviet Union will play high risk politics in the year of 1984 prior to the November Presidential election. This prediction, too, suggests another Caribbean crisis, but this time perhaps with the roles reversed. I will return to this problem later, but it is against this ominous background of a nascent Soviet strategic threat from Cuba that we now have confirmation of a whole series of Soviet arms control violations.

Mr. President, after many months of careful study, President Reagan finally reported to Congress on January 23, 1984, that the Soviet Union had violated six arms control treaties in nine different cases.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President's letter and report be printed in the Record at the end of my speech.

There being no objection, the letter and report were ordered to be printed in the Record.

President Reagan stated that five of these nine Soviet arms control treaty violations, including two related to the SALT II Treaty, were clearcut, unqualified, and unequivocal violations.

The President's Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements stated succinctly:

The U.S. Government has determined that the Soviet Union is violating:

1. The Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons
2. The Biological Weapons Convention
3. The Helsinki Final Act, and two provisions of SALT II
4. Telemetry encryption; and
5. A rule concerning ICBM modernization. In addition, we have determined that the Soviet Union has—
6. Almost certainly violated the SALT II ICBM Treaty;
7. Probably violated the SALT II limit on new types;
8. Probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II; and
9. Is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

To repeat, there have been nine Soviet arms control violations of six treaties confirmed by the President, five of which were conclusive and two of these conclusive violations related to SALT II. A total of four of the nine violations reported related to SALT II. The Defense Department has recently stated authoritatively that the Soviets currently have two new types of land-based ICBM's under advanced

June 20, 1984

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 7673

stages of development, thereby making this another unqualified violation of SALT II, for a total of three unqualified Soviet SALT II violations.

As Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle has stated: "It's not alleged cheating, it's cheating—period." And as Governor Reagan stated in 1978, "We know that they—the Soviets—violated the entire spirit and terms of SALT I."

Mr. President, President Reagan's report is historic and unprecedented. It is the first time in history that a U.S. President has ever accused the Soviet Union of a violation of a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. It indicates that the Soviets are violating every major arms control treaty in force today. It is an irrevocable report.

Unfortunately, however, it covers only the tip of the iceberg of Soviet arms control and treaty violations. As Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle testified to the Senate on March 14, 1984, the violations in the President's report were illustrative only and he mentioned 20 to 25 additional existing violations.

OTHER SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY TREATIES

What is the full scope of Soviet arms control and other treaty violations? It is well known that there are over 40 more Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations alone which have not yet been reported on to Congress by the President, but which can be confirmed by other authorities. I will describe each of these later.

In addition, other Reagan administration spokesmen have publicly and authoritatively accused the Soviet Union of violating:

The Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 by suppressing freedom in Eastern Europe;

The United Nations Charter by threatening to reinvade Poland in 1981;

Various international agreements governing civil aviation by the brutal Soviet shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 007 and the murder of 269 innocent civilians; and

The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement during the U.S. attempts to recover the KAL-007 black box.

Indeed, there is strong evidence that the Soviets shot down KAL-007 in order to cover up their planned flight-testing that very night of September 1, 1983, one or more of their new type ICBM's which violate SALT II. And since the KAL-007 shoot-down, the Soviets have reportedly been jamming U.S. national technical means of SALT verification, an altogether new and unprecedented SALT violation. This jamming could bring arms control negotiations to a complete halt, because it is an act of extreme hostility.

Our West German allies have accused the Soviets of violating the United Nations Charter and the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of War by their brutal invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. And I believe that the Soviets have violated the 1967 Tia-

teloco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, by their deployment of nuclear delivery capability to Cuba.

The Soviet Union has a long history of treaty violations. A study done in 1955 by the Senate Judiciary Committee established the fact that the Soviets had violated over 50 treaties since 1917. I put this study into the Record on February 1, 1984. The study even found that the Soviets were violating the very agreement which established United States-Soviet diplomatic relations, the 1933 Litvinov agreement, by continuing to support revolutionary activities inside the United States despite their 1933 pledge to cease this support.

In the latest edition of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia—for 1983, the Soviet military openly states:

Achievements in biology and related sciences (biochemistry, biophysics, molecular biology, genetics, microbiology, and experimental aerobiology) have led to an increase in the effectiveness of biological agents as a means of conducting warfare. Improved methods of obtaining and using them have resulted in a qualitative re-examination of the very concept of biological weapons.

This is an explicit Soviet military recognition of their interest in and knowledge of biological warfare, which is outlawed by the 1972 Biological Warfare Convention.

Official State and Defense Department documents from 1959 and 1962 in turn confirmed the Senate report that the Soviets had violated over 50 treaties since 1917. Most of these Soviet violations were of nonaggression, peace, or friendship treaties. In fact, the only international security agreement that the U.S.S.R. scrupulously abided by was the August 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact, which allowed the Soviets to conquer Poland, and which led to the outbreak of World War II.

According to official U.S. Government sources, the Soviets have thus violated arms control treaties in over 40 cases, and violated over 50 other international security treaties. In addition there have been over 120 cases of Soviet diplomatic forgeries and deceptions.

With Soviet aid and encouragement, North Vietnam broke the Paris accords on peace in Southeast Asia throughout the 1973-75 period.

The conclusion emerges, Mr. President, from official U.S. Government documentation, that the Soviets have violated, evaded, or circumvented almost every international security treaty they have signed since 1917. The only security treaty they kept led to World War II. This is a sobering conclusion.

There is also strong evidence that the Soviet Politburo even planned and executed the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II in June 1981. This plot violated all standards of morality and decency, and was a threat to all mankind. Not even the diabolical mass murderer Adolf Hitler is known to have attacked the person of the Pope.

The evidence of history shows that the Soviet Union is truly an outlaw nation.

The confirmed Soviet violations of the chemical and biological warfare treaties are more than just simple arms control treaty violations. They are genocidal atrocities. Over 10,000 innocent men, women, and children in southeast and southwest Asia have died horrible and cruel deaths. All for the sake of Soviet aggression, in violation of other solemn international agreements.

PEACE THROUGH SPACE DEFENSE

Nevertheless, Mr. President, the United States should continue always to seek peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. Surely we must always seek to resolve our differences with the Soviets through peaceful diplomacy and negotiations. We must always be willing to continue to negotiate arms control agreements with the Soviets, despite the sordid history of their past treaty violations. We must convince the Soviets, however, that arms control negotiations now must first be focused upon ending their violations of existing treaties, before there can be further progress toward any new agreements. This is simple commonsense, and it should be easy for the Soviets and the whole world to understand. Soviet deception, treachery, and violations should result in some penalties for the Soviets, because these actions have jeopardized American security and threatened world peace.

Mr. President, if arms control treaties have been ineffective in reducing the risk of nuclear war, and if Soviet SALT violations are increasing the risk of nuclear war, what other alternatives to preserve peace are available to us? After we detect Soviet arms control treaty violations, what should we do?

I believe that a space based, layered antiballistic missile defense is the best way to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The United States can unilaterally deploy strategic defenses in space, and these U.S. ABM defenses in space are not necessarily a threat to the Soviet Union. Strategic defenses are non-threatening, nonprovocative, and could even use nonnuclear technology. This response to Soviet arms control cheating could be made independently of arms control. An American space based antiballistic missile defense could make the Soviet strategic offensive capability, so laboriously built up over the years, totally obsolete. I will have more to say about strategic defenses later this year.

SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS PLANNED 12 YEARS AGO

Mr. President, in light of the confirmed Soviet violations, it is fair to conclude that arms control has been a traditional Soviet tactic used to disarm opponents by misleading them regarding Soviet intentions. This has been especially noticeable, to those who are

S 7674

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1984

to see, in the modern age where the technological lead times can be traced backward to show that Soviet agreement to arms control treaties were only deliberate acts of deception, undertaken with plans to violate or abrogate the treaties even before the treaties were made final.

There are many clear examples strongly supporting this conclusion. These include the 1958 nuclear test moratorium, the 1972 SALT I Interim agreement and ABM Treaty, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and the 1979 SALT II Treaty.

The Soviet violations or abrogations that were planned at the very time the treaties were signed include:

The massive breakout of the 1958 nuclear test moratorium in August 1961 with the largest, most extensive nuclear test series ever conducted;

The deployment of the SS-19 ICBM in violation of the 1972 SALT I Interim agreement;

The testing in an ABM mode of the SAM-5, SAM-10, and SAM-12 systems in violation of the 1972 SALT I ABM Treaty;

The deployment of a comprehensive and coordinated pattern of ABM battle management radars;

The continued development, manufacture, and stockpiling of both toxin and biological weapons;

The encryption of all essential missile test data;

And the testing and deployment of two disallowed ICBM's.

In all of these cases, the violations or abrogations were planned by the Soviets at the time they signed the treaty. The treaties can thus only be regarded as deceptions designed and used by the Soviets to gain unilateral advantage.

The Soviets signed the SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons and the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on May 26, 1972. These two agreements are linked together in their preambles and in their internal provisions.

Only now, 14 years later, can we finally begin to understand what the Soviet leaders intended in agreeing to sign the SALT I agreements. There are two types of evidence of Soviet intentions in signing the SALT I agreements. We can first trace their actual behavior as observed in their offensive and defensive strategic programs. From the patterns of their behavior, we can infer the intentions of the Soviet leadership in signing the SALT I Agreements. Second, we have very unusual and dramatic direct evidence of the Soviet leadership's intentions in signing SALT I.

In early 1973, the Soviets began flight testing their new ICBM, the SS-19. It took the United States until early 1975 to determine with confidence that the SS-19 was regarded by the Soviets to be a heavy ICBM, and that the Soviets intended their heavy SS-19 to replace 360 light SS-11 ICBM's. This was contrary to article II

of the SALT I Interim Agreement, which prohibited heavy ICBM's from replacing light ICBM's. Thus we can infer from the history of the Soviet heavy SS-19 program that the Soviet leaders intended to violate the SALT I Interim Agreement from the very date of its signing in 1972.

Also in early 1973, the Soviets began constructing the first of what became a total of six large antiballistic missile battle management radars. These six large radars, each the size of two Egyptian pyramids, form an integral, coherent pattern. Five of the six are on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. and point outward. But the sixth radar, discovered well along in construction only last July, is in the middle of Siberia and points inward toward the Pacific coasts of Russia. These six large radars are part of one integral pattern, because their radar coverage cones converge and close all but one gap in coverage—this one gap is from the Mediterranean Sea. Thus when looking at these six large radars, first started in 1973, and now almost completed, we can discern a pattern. No single radar itself makes sense without the others; they are integrally linked, because the radar cones of their coverage overlap.

But the SALT I ABM Treaty specifies in article I, the most important provision, that the Soviets can not have a nationwide ABM defense, or even the base for a nationwide defense. These 6 radars clearly provide a base for a nationwide ABM defense, when linked up with AMB-3, SAM-5, SAM-10, and SAM-12 mobile missiles and radars now in mass production and deployment. Moreover, the last of the 6 radars, the newly discovered Abalakovo or Krasnoyarsk radar, violates article VI of the ABM Treaty, which specifies that all early warning radars must be on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. and pointed outward. This radar is in the interior and pointed inward.

Indeed, a third violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty is entailed by the location of the Krasnoyarsk radar. This is of article III, and the protocol to the ABM Treaty, which allow only one Soviet ABM site, to defend either the capital or ICBM's. The Krasnoyarsk ABM radar is very near about 200 Soviet ICBM silos, and is ideally suited by its location to control interceptor ABM missiles to defend these ICBM's. Hence this radar is at least a triple violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty. Its orientation, siting, and capabilities each violate the treaty, and the complete pattern of radars suggests that this was planned in 1972, when the treaty was signed.

In addition to the SS-19 and the ABM radar programs, which provide strong inferential evidence of the intentions of Soviet leaders, there is also evidence from now public sensitive intelligence sources. This evidence was first discussed in public in 1976, and Senator McClellan mentioned it before himself in his speech on the MX last

May 25. I will discuss this evidence in more detail later. But let me summarize this evidence now by simply saying that it clearly shows that the Soviet leaders themselves explicitly planned to violate the fundamental provisions, article II, of the SALT I Interim Agreement by illegally deploying their heavy SS-19 ICBM to replace their light SS-11. In fact, the Soviet leader Brezhnev himself made the decision to violate the SALT I Interim Agreement by deploying the heavy SS-19 just before he actually signed the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty on May 26, 1972.

The top level Soviet political decision to violate the ABM Treaty also dates from May 1972, because as I have mentioned, construction on the first of what became a pattern of six or more huge ABM battle management radars was started in 1973. The decision to build the entire network logically also predated the May 1972 Soviet decision to sign the SALT I ABM Treaty.

In addition to the now public sensitive intelligence evidence and the SS-19 and ABM radar deployments supporting this conclusion, the Soviets themselves seemed to confirm this judgment when they openly stated in 1980 that détente began to erode after 1973. The Soviets in fact were telling us that, from the start, to them détente only meant increased competition.

The Defense Department Report to Congress for fiscal year 1985 confirms the above evidence and my conclusion by stating:

Several of these violations must have been planned by Soviet authorities many years ago, in some cases perhaps at the very time the Soviet Union entered into the agreements.

And a top Defense official, Ricard Perle, recently testified to Congress that:

The Soviets have not hesitated to mislead us, deliberately and all too successfully.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Ricard Perle testified to the Senate on March 28, 1984 that the Soviet Union deliberately signed the SALT I agreement fully intending to later violate SALT I with weapons giving them a sixfold increase in nuclear warheads aimed at the United States. Perle added that there is a great deal of evidence of the Russians' intent, some of which was obtained through secret intelligence sources.

Perle accused the Soviets of placing loopholes in the SALT I agreements, which they later exploited with weapons that were unknown to the United States at the time of the negotiations. The single most important violation was the development of the giant SS-19 ICBM, which Perle called a very much larger missile than U.S. negotiators believed would be allowed under SALT I. Perle added that we believe they refrained from testing it in the closing months of the negotiations so

June 20, 1984

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 1675

that we would be unaware of it when we signed the treaty. Immediately after the treaty was signed, we saw the first test of the SS-19.

Perle added that "the Soviets knew there was the loophole in the treaty. We know they knew it. The SS-19 program resulted in an increase by six times in the number of ballistic warheads aimed at the United States."

This Soviet intention to violate SALT I from the outset in 1972 is also confirmed by the following interchange between Senator JIM McCLOURE and the former Chief of Naval Operations at the time of SALT I, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt:

TRANSCRIPT OF QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION BETWEEN SENATOR McCLOURE AND ADMIRAL ELMO ZUMWALT BEFORE THE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, MARCH 28, 1984

McCLOURE. In 1972, you testified on SALT I that if the Soviets deployed a heavy ICBM to replace light ICBMs, this would violate SALT I. Do you believe the Soviets' heavy SS-19 ICBM deployment violated SALT I?

ZUMWALT. I believe that it does. Directly violates SALT I as SALT I was reported and explained to the Congress of the United States during its ratification process, and I believe there was information available to the government at the time, but unknown to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that confirmed that a violation was going to be made.

McCLOURE. That's an interesting comment. I don't want to get diverted too far, but I want to underscore your statement that our government had information that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not have. Did I understand you correctly?

ZUMWALT. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. McCLOURE. That, to me, is a separate issue, but not entirely separate, and a very serious charge. Because if our Joint Chiefs can't have all the information we have, how in the world can they make their judgment?

ZUMWALT. This is a matter that, at some point, we will have to go into in classified session.

The seriousness of the Perle statement and Senator McCLOURE's dialog with Admiral Zumwalt is further illustrated. As the late distinguished Senator Jackson stated on June 23, 1976 in the Senate Committee on Armed Services: My interpretation [in 1972] as to what the Soviets could do, with the SS-11 has turned out to be absolutely true. [Jackson predicted in 1972 that the Soviets would replace the light SS-11 with a heavy ICBM as large as the SS-19.] And what the understanding was on the part of the President's representatives was contrary to that. And as you know, Secretary Laird has said that it is a complete violation of the understanding that they [the Nixon administration] had. . . . We [the Senate] were lied to in SALT I. . . . We were lied to by the Secretary, the now Secretary of State Kissinger. . . . It turned out that the things we predicted were right. . . . Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has since corroborated it, that they [the Nixon administration] were misled [by the Soviets].

Thus we can confirm that there is conclusive evidence that the Soviets signed SALT I in 1972 fully intending

to violate the agreements. Admiral Zumwalt revealed for the first time that this evidence had been withheld from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the summer of 1972 until after the JCS had testified in favor of SALT I. In fact, a CIA Inspector General's report of October 1978 confirms this conclusion regarding Kissinger's withholding from the JCS. Finally, the late Senator Jackson has also confirmed that the Senate was "lied to" on SALT I. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the SALT I ABM Treaty and the SALT I interim offensive agreement were ratified and approved under false pretenses. Had the JCS and the Senate been made aware of this key evidence on the Soviet intent to violate SALT I in 1972, SALT I might never have received congressional approval.

But there is more. The Soviets also signed the Biological Warfare Convention in 1972, and there was immediate evidence that their existing biological warfare plants continued to expand, instead of being dismantled, as required by the BW Convention. In fact, some new biological warfare facilities were even constructed after 1972 and after 1975, when the convention was ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Thus there is a pattern of Soviet behavior spanning the two SALT I agreements and the Biological Warfare Convention, all signed in 1972. The evidence indicates clearly and conclusively that in 1972 the Soviet leaders signed these three solemn international arms control treaties fully intending to violate the principal constraints of the treaties from the very outset.

The Soviets likewise knew in 1974 when they signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty that they were planning to deploy new warheads with yields much larger than 150 kilotons on their new fourth and fifth generation ICBMs. Thus they knew they would have to violate the threshold test ban yield of 150 kilotons. The reason is that also in 1974 the Soviets began developing their new SS-X-24 and SS-X-25 new type ICBMs, both of which eventually would also violate the SALT II Treaty then being negotiated. These new ICBMs are estimated to carry warheads with yields much larger than 150 kilotons.

And as Under Secretary of Defense Richard DeLauer testified to the Senate on March 13, 1984:

Major programs recently deployed or now late in development were generally initiated at the highest levels of Soviet leadership about ten years ago. (Emphasis added.)

This statement confirms that the illegal Soviet SS-X-25 and the illegally encrypted SS-X-24 programs began in 1974 at the direction of Brezhnev and Ustinov and Marshal Ogarkov.

According to the April 1984 third edition of the Defense Department book "Soviet Military Power":

The USSR has stretched the limits and spirit of both the SALT I and SALT II agreements in expanding and modernizing its strategic arsenal.

This confirms the facts that the Soviets have gained significant unilateral advantages from SALT.

Mr. President, it, therefore should come as no surprise to us that the Soviets likewise signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in 1974, the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and the SALT II Treaty in 1979, fully intending from the start to violate these solemn arms control treaties, just as they in fact did in the case of the 1972 SALT I interim agreement and ABM Treaty, and the Biological Warfare Convention.

But Sidney Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner on the SALT Standing Consultative Commission from 1972 to 1978 testified to the Senate in 1979 that:

I do not believe that the Soviets would enter into any agreement which required them to cheat in order to attain their military objectives, or on which they planned to cheat.

The evidence indicated that Mr. Graybeal is flatly wrong, and he should have known he was wrong when he testified.

SOVIET ADVANTAGES FROM SALT VIOLATIONS

What have the Soviets gained from almost a decade and a half of SALT violations intended from as early as 1972? The Soviets have achieved an overwhelming shift in both the strategic and in the overall military balance since SALT began 15 years ago in 1969. The United States and the West are far more insecure today than when strategic arms limitation talks began in 1969.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following two articles be printed at this point in the Record. The first article is from the Boston Globe of February 11, 1977, by William Beecher, and is entitled "Brezhnev Termed Detente a Ruse, 1973 Report Said." The second article is from the New York Times of September 17, 1973, by John Finney. These two articles demonstrate the evidence that the Soviets consider detente and SALT to be a huge deception effort aimed at achieving decisive superiority over the West.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1977]

BREZHNEV TERMED DETENTE A RUSE, 1973

REPORT SAID

(By William Beecher)

WASHINGTON.—A suppressed report from British intelligence in early 1973 quoted Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev as privately declaring that detente was a ruse designed to lead to a decisive shift in the balance of power.

The report was denigrated and dismissed by Henry Kissinger, according to well-placed sources. But the first reference to it was included in the latest National Intelligence Estimate in 1978, sources said.

S 7676

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1984

The sources who have seen the report say it was represented by the British as dynamic, comparable in importance with the texts of the 1956 speech by Nikita Khrushchev detailing the sins of Stalin.

It quoted Brezhnev as telling a secret meeting of East European Communist party leaders in Prague that détente was a strategy to allow the Soviets to build up their military and economic power so that by 1985 "a decisive shift in the corollation of forces" would enable the Russians to "exert our will wherever we need to."

The report came during the height of euphoria in the United States about the promise of détente, a policy of which Kissinger was the principal architect and exponent.

"The report was as welcome as a dose of chicken pox as far as Henry was concerned," one source recalls. "I suspect that had it been more congenial to what he was trying to accomplish it would have gotten wider attention and credence."

The British said they obtained the account from a man who attended the lengthy Prague meeting called by Brezhnev to assuage fears that he was ready to sacrifice East European interests at the altar of détente.

British intelligence was so sensitive about the source that one copy was hand carried to Washington for the director of Central Intelligence. He in turn sent copies to only six officials: the President, his national security advisory, the secretaries of State and Defense and the intelligence chiefs of the State Department and the Pentagon.

The document classified top secret, carried the unusual admonition not to duplicate it or discuss it with any but the addressees.

That admonition notwithstanding, sources say, the matter was discussed among a tight circle of high officials. Kissinger and others reportedly suggested that since the account came from an untried source and couldn't be corroborated, it should be regarded as untrustworthy and dismissed.

Others said that even if it . . . genuine, the report represented the kind of thing Brezhnev might be expected to say to calm nervous Communist bloc leaders without reflecting his true thinking or plans.

An attempt to reach Kissinger for comment this week before he left on a Mexican holiday was unsuccessful.

The British report was based on the recollections of . . . the Prague meeting. There is no way of knowing whether specific quotes attributed to Brezhnev were entirely accurate.

According to three senior . . . will have consolidated our position. We will have improved our economy. And a decisive shift in the corollation of forces will be such that come 1985, we will be able to exert our will wherever we need to."

Even in retrospect, senior analysts say they cannot be sure how faithful was the account of the Brezhnev speech. But they say the words are consistent with subsequent public statements by Brezhnev and with certain Soviet actions.

So in the National Intelligence Estimate for 1976, drawn up late last year after a major debate between CIA analysts and a team of outside specialists headed by Harvard Professor Richard Pipes, for the first time reference was made to the Prague meeting and the reported Brezhnev statements there, well placed sources say . . . was the gist of the report.

Brezhnev said he was aware of the concern of the East European leaders that détente initiatives seemed to be moving so fast that their interests might be sacrificed.

But he insisted that his pursuit of détente was designed to serve their common inter-

ests not to compromise them. "We are achieving with détente what our predecessors have been unable to achieve using the mailed fist," he reportedly said.

He then went through an appraisal of trends in various Western countries, reportedly saying that Finland was in the Soviet pocket, Norway was still troublesome, but trends were moving in the right direction. Denmark, he said, was no longer a viable element of Western strength.

In the United Kingdom, Brezhnev continued, the USSR's fondest expectations were being exceeded because of the efforts of its fellow socialist brethren. French foreign policy, he said, was Marxist. Trends in Italy, he remarked, were favorable.

But he reportedly said it was in West Germany that "our greatest achievements are being realized." He said "our great and true friend, fellow socialist, Willy Brandt, has brought about a miracle" by making it possible prementally to consolidate contested borders and by pushing through his Ostpolitik.

"We have been able to accomplish more in a short time with détente than was done for years pursuing confrontation policy with NATO," he said.

He noted that while negotiations proceeded on SALT and on Mutual Balance Force Reductions the United States was unlikely to build up militarily in reaction to the Soviet buildup, he reportedly concluded.

"Trust us, comrades, for by 1985 as a consequence of what we are now achieving with détente, we will have achieved most of our (?) objectives in Western Europe. We . . .

(From the New York Times, Sept. 17, 1973)
(By John W. Finney)

WASHINGTON, September 18.—According to intelligence reports recently received here, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, has emphasized to Eastern European leaders that the movement toward improving relations with the West is a tactical policy change to permit the Soviet bloc to establish its superiority in the next 12 to 15 years.

Although there is some question about the authenticity of the reports, they are contributing to a debate within the Administration over whether the current Soviet course really represents a basic change in intention or is merely a temporary shift.

As summarized by Defense and State Department officials who have studied the intelligence reports, the Brezhnev explanation went like this:

To the Soviet Union, the policy of accommodation does represent a tactical policy shift. Over the next 15 years or so, the Soviet Union intends to pursue accords with the West and at the same time build up its own economic and military strength.

At the end of this period, in about the middle nineteen-eighties, the strength of the Soviet bloc will have increased to the point at which the Soviet Union, instead of relying on accords, could establish an independent, superior position in its dealings with the West.

HOW UNITED STATES GOT REPORTS

The intelligence reports are for the most part third- or fourth-hand accounts of Brezhnev statements that have filtered through Eastern European sources to Western intelligence agencies and finally to the United States intelligence community.

The authenticity of one report of a Brezhnev conversation with an Eastern European leader last spring, before the Soviet leader met in June with President Nixon, was said to have been vouched for by British intelligence, which received the report and turned it over to the United States. American offi-

cials said that similar intelligence reports have been received concerning other such Brezhnev statements, both in Moscow and in Eastern European capitals.

SUSPICIONS AMONG MILITARY

The attitude among specialists on the Soviet Union is to accept the intelligence reports as probably accurate. Differences have developed within the Administration over how to interpret the statements.

Some "high-ranking military" officials regard the intelligence reports as confirmation of their suspicions that the Russians are intent upon using accommodation as a way of disarming the West and establishing a military superiority that will permit a more aggressive Soviet foreign policy.

Most civilian analysts of the Soviet Union place less ominous interpretation on the intelligence reports. They tend to consider the reported Brezhnev statements an internal tactic designed to mollify the hardline opposition within the Communists camp as the Soviet leader pursues a policy of détente with the West.

The reports have had considerable impact on the Pentagon. When they are asked to document their contention that the Soviet Union was intent on establishing military superiority over the United States, high-ranking officers immediately cite the intelligence reports on what is coming to be known within the Pentagon as "the new Brezhnev doctrine."

TURNING SCREWS ON UNITED STATES

From the first concrete steps toward East-West accommodation, military officials have tended to suspect Soviet intentions, as reflected in the reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about last year's agreement limiting offensive strategic arms. A common military judgment is that the Soviet Union may be using accommodation in part to lower the guard of the West while it pursues a build-up in the 1980-85 period to achieve military superiority.

This judgment tends to be supported by the intelligence reports on the Brezhnev statements about pursuing accords for 12 to 15 years. To United States military officials, the implication is that by the end of that period the Soviet Union believes it will be in an economic and military position at which it can begin, as one high officer put it, "to start turning the screws on the United States."

Perhaps not completely by coincidence, the reports began to appear at a time when the defense budget faced a serious challenge on the Senate floor. The Senate begins debate this week on the annual military procurement bill, with moves planned to cut away at various weapons and manpower programs.

In the face of a growing view in the Senate that accommodation should permit a re-examination of defense policies, the Defense Department has been going to considerable lengths to emphasize that détente does not permit cuts in the defense budget. In assailing moves to reduce defense spending, for example, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger emphasized recently that despite the hopeful atmosphere, Soviet bloc military strength was still growing. He characterized the Soviet Union as having "a mailed fist encased in the velvet glove of détente."

CIVILIAN-MILITARY DEBATE

It appears that the intelligence reports have contributed to the differences between military circles in the Pentagon and civilian circles in the State Department in assessing Soviet intentions.

June 20, 1984

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 7677

Civilian analysts of the Soviet Union read the Brezhnev statements as emphasizing accommodation as a way of achieving an economic, rather than military, build-up of the Soviet bloc—not some long-range master plan for military superiority over the United States.

It was also the prevailing belief in civilian circles that the Brezhnev statements were motivated by internal political considerations within the Communist bloc.

Within the Communist party in the Soviet Union, as well as in some of the Eastern European countries, according to Soviet specialists, there appear to be some lingering reservations about the desirability of a cooperative policy with the West. The Brezhnev statements, therefore, were interpreted as an attempt to provide a rationale and justification that would permit all factions, including the ideological hardliners to join behind a policy of cooperation with the West for 12 to 15 years.

As one Government specialist on Soviet affairs put it: "The self-proclaimed tactical shift is probably a tactic in itself."

Mr. SYMMS. There is a relationship between the intentions of Soviet leaders and the capabilities they develop and control. They have developed a tremendous strategic superiority, both offensive and defensive. We can infer from these deliberately developed capabilities that the intentions of Soviet leaders are to use these capabilities for intimidation and blackmail.

BREZHNEV INTENDED SOVIET WORLD DOMINATION BY 1985

New credence should therefore be given to the 1973 intelligence report of a secret speech by the late Soviet leader Brezhnev to Warsaw Pact Communist Party leaders. Brezhnev stated explicitly that détente with the West was a gigantic deception and ruse designed deliberately to enable the Soviet Union to gain military supremacy. Brezhnev predicted that détente would lull the West into complacency while allowing the Soviets to achieve worldwide, global dominance by 1985. The Soviets may not be ahead of this schedule, given their flagrant SALT breakout in 1983, resulting from their SALT violations decisions made in 1972.

MARSHAL OGARKOV, SALT, AND STRATEGIC DECEPTION

Soviet Marshal Nicolai Ogarkov, now chief of the Soviet General Staff, was the top Soviet military delegate to the SALT I negotiations from 1969 to 1971. Ogarkov has remained closely involved in devising the Soviet SALT negotiating strategy and positions since 1971, because we know that the Soviet military establishment plays the most influential role in both defense planning and SALT negotiating. The Soviet military formulates its 5-year defense plans, and then devises its SALT negotiating strategy and positions in order to protect these plans from being constrained by SALT.

Mr. President, what is not widely understood in the United States is the now well documented fact that Marshal Ogarkov was simultaneously the creator and first Director of the General Staff's Directorate of Strategic Deception. The purpose of this Director-

ate of Deception is to coordinate Soviet strategic camouflage, concealment, and deception with the Soviet SALT negotiating and compliance policy. If détente and SALT have been a gigantic but highly successful ruse for the Soviets, then Ogarkov and his Deception Directorate are largely responsible. But the top Soviet political leadership, including the late Soviet Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov, were just as deeply involved in the decisions on Soviet SALT negotiating deception and violations. Indeed, I have already mentioned the conclusive documentation of the Soviet leadership's deceptive intentions in SALT dating from as early as 1972.

SOVIET SALT BREAKOUT

In fact, the Soviets use arms control negotiations to gain unilateral advantage. After negotiating SALT agreements with loopholes that leave all of their strategic programs unconstrained, the Soviets then go further to violate and circumvent the SALT agreements.

The Soviets are now flight-testing a new small mobile ICBM, the SS-X-25, which will probably carry several MIRV warheads each with yields well above 150 kilotons.

The Soviets are also constructing new ABM battle management radars and mass producing new mobile surface-to-air interceptor missiles and radars with ABM capabilities and new mobile ABM interceptor missiles and radars.

Thus America may now be witnessing the Soviet SALT breakout deployment of an illegal new mobile ICBM, carrying illegal new MIRVed warheads, and defended by an illegal ABM system using illegal large battle-management radars and illegal mobile ABM and ABM capable SAM interceptor missiles and radars.

Again, all of this was decided upon in 1972 and 1974, 12 to 14 years ago.

In fact, the Soviets may soon have not only an illegal nationwide ABM system which could protect key industrial areas, but this same illegal ABM system could also protect a significant percentage of the Soviet ICBM force. The Moscow ABM complex is being modernized and expanded with new radars and new interceptor missiles, including interceptors which can be rapidly reloaded and refired. The Moscow ABM system can already defend several hundred MIRVed ICBM silos deployed near Moscow. The new Siberian ABM radar at Krasnoyarsk, moreover, is ideally located and oriented to help defend hundreds of nearby MIRVed-ICBM silos and mobile ICBM and IRBM deployment areas.

Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the Soviets are now deploying ABM systems which could defend up to about 30 percent or even more of the Soviet ICBM warheads. This would give the Soviets not only a first strike capability, but also an invulnerable first strike capability, and an in-

vulnerable second strike capability. These Soviet capabilities already greatly erode the U.S. deterrent retaliatory capability.

Moreover, there is evidence that the Soviets have deployed 12 to 14 warheads on each of their giant SS-18 super-heavy ICBM's. SALT II allows them only 10 warheads on each SS-18. The Soviets have over 308 SS-18's. Such a SALT II violation could thus allow the Soviets to increase the number of their ICBM warheads by from 616 to 1,304 warheads. This probable Soviet SALT II violation has not yet been confirmed by the President, but I am confident that it is a Soviet violation.

SOVIET SALT DUPLICITY

Mr. President, as I have pointed out, the Soviet record of SALT violations and diplomatic duplicity is a long one. As former President Jimmy Carter stated on December 31, 1979, Soviet President Brezhnev's response to Carter's note requesting an explanation of the reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan "was obviously false . . . The tone of his [i.e. Brezhnev's] message to me . . . was completely inadequate and completely misleading. He is not telling the facts accurately . . . My opinion of the Russians has changed more drastically in the last week than even the previous two and a half years before that . . . This action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviet's ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time I've been in office."

As our distinguished colleague, Senator JOHN WARNER, stated in a Senate floor speech on January 2, 1980:

In view of the President's [i.e. Carter's] statement that Brezhnev lied to him about Afghanistan, it might well be that Brezhnev lied during the SALT II negotiations.

And as President Reagan stated on January 29, 1981, " . . . they [the Soviets] reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat . . . "

Mr. President, I have already mentioned the sensitive intelligence evidence that Brezhnev lied to the United States in the SALT I negotiations over the Soviet heavy SS-19 ICBM. Brezhnev also lied to the United States again in SALT II over the capabilities and production rate of the Backfire bomber, according to Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle and many other experts.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle testified to Congress on February 22, 1984:

The Soviets have not hesitated to mislead us, deliberately and all too successfully.

In fact, there have been over 14 cases of Soviet negotiating deception in SALT I and SALT II which can be fully documented with unclassified evidence.

Mr. President, despite protestations of seeking only equal security and no unilateral advantages, there is a pre-

S 7678

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1984

dominant objective in the Soviet approach to arms control. The evidence shows that the Soviets have used arms control negotiations and agreements in order to gain unilateral advantages and to achieve overall strategic superiority over the United States. This has clearly been the Soviet goal and achievement in the SALT I Interim Agreement and ABM Treaty, the Biological Warfare Convention, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Helsinki Final Act, and in the SALT II Treaty. But the Soviet circumventions and violations of these arms control treaties have destroyed all of the basic objectives that the United States had in entering into these treaties.

The official Soviet propaganda publication entitled "Whence the Threat to Peace" published in 1982 denies the existence of any Soviet arms control treaty violations. It states:

The Soviet Union's attitude to its international commitments is clearly formulated in the Constitution of the USSR. The Soviet Union has never violated the standards of international law or any treaties or agreements. It has always been a reliable partner in international affairs. "If we put our signature under a treaty," Leonid Brezhnev pointed out, "We mean that we are fully resolved to adhere to its letter and spirit strictly and entirely." (Emphasis added.)

THE SEVEN MOST SIGNIFICANT SOVIET VIOLATIONS

The problem of Soviet noncompliance with arms control treaties has to be dealt with as a matter of the highest national priority. I would like, Mr. President, to remind the Senate that on April 14, 1983, Senator Jim McCLELLAN pointed out on the Senate floor the seven most military significant Soviet arms control violations. I would like to recall again for my colleagues those seven most dangerous Soviet arms control violations as pointed out by JIM McCLELLAN:

First, Soviet deployment of heavy ICBM's replacing light ICBM's enabling them to quintuple their counterforce capability.

Second, Soviet ICBM rapid reload/refire, stockpiling of extra missiles, covert soft launch and mobile ICBM capability, circumventing all SALT launcher ceilings, and also adding a strategic reserve with strong counterforce capabilities.

Third, Soviet flight-testing of two new type ICBM's, in violation of SALT II, which adds to an already overwhelming counterforce capability.

Fourth, Soviet violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in militarily significant ways, which also adds to their counterforce capability.

Fifth, Soviet development of a nationwide ABM defense, through their construction of ABM battle-management radars, three types of SAM's for ABM mode use, and a mobile and rapidly deployable new ABM in mass production. All of these capabilities give the Soviets a real ABM breakout capability.

Sixth, Soviet violation of the Biological Warfare and Chemical Weapons Conventions.

Seventh, Soviet deployment of offensive weapons to Cuba, in violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement of 1962.

Of these seven most militarily significant Soviet SALT violations that Senator JIM McCLELLAN already long ago pointed out to the Senate, four have been confirmed by President Reagan in his report of January 23, 1984.

President Reagan confirmed that the Soviets are:

One, illegally testing two new type ICBM's, in violation of SALT II, which adds even more to an already overwhelming Soviet counterforce capability;

Two, Soviet violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which also adds to their already overwhelming counterforce capability;

Three, Soviet development of an illegal nationwide ABM defense, as exemplified by their illegal Krasnoyarsk radar and their tests of SAM missiles and radars in an ABM mode. Moreover, Dr. Henry Kissinger, chief negotiator of SALT I, conceded in September 1982 that the Soviet tests of SAM's in an ABM mode violated SALT I. The President's violations report added that: Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty could be very significant.

Four, Soviet violations of the biological and chemical warfare treaties.

Thus four of Senator McCLELLAN's original seven most militarily significant Soviet SALT violations have been confirmed by President Reagan.

Of these seven most militarily significant Soviet SALT violations that Senator McCLELLAN pointed out, three are not included in President Reagan's report to Congress. These are:

One, Soviet deployment of heavy SS-19 ICBM's to replace light SS-11 ICBM's, in violation of article II of the SALT I Interim Agreement;

Two, Soviet rapid reload and refire ICBM capability and illegal stockpiling of extra ICBM's, in violation and circumvention of SALT II's provisions and all five SALT II launcher ceilings;

Three, Soviet deployment of offensive weapons, including nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and storage facilities, to Cuba, in violation of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement which ended the Cuban missile crisis.

On each of these three militarily significant Soviet violations, however, there is strong confirmation of Senator McCLELLAN's original charge.

In 1974, former Defense Secretary Laird charged that Soviet SS-19 deployment was a clearcut Soviet violation of the SALT I interim agreement. Many other top defense leaders and experts agree with Laird. In 1979, former Secretary of State Kissinger conceded that illegal Soviet SS-19 deployment was sharp practice, and that Soviet resistance to a heavy ICBM definition in SALT II constituted a significant failure in the SALT II Treaty's

negotiation and drafting. Finally, even the Senate Intelligence Committee under former Senator Birch Bayh stated in its October 1979 report on the verifiability of SALT II that Soviet SS-19 deployment at least circumvented the SALT I interim agreement. Thus, there is strong support for my charge.

The Defense Department has expressed public concern that Soviet stockpiled missiles have at least circumvented the four SALT II ceilings on launchers, 2,250, 1,320, 1,200, and 820.

In September 1983, and in May 1982, President Reagan himself explicitly and publicly accused the Soviets of abrogating or violating the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement by their military activities in Cuba. These charges have been backed up by three top officials.

The Kissinger Commission report released in January 1984, emphasizes that there is an acute and urgent crisis in Central America. The main security problem in the region is the Soviet military base in Cuba and Soviet-Cuban support for the Sandinista efforts to attack the peaceful states in the region. The Soviet military base in Cuba and Soviet support for revolution in the Western Hemisphere violate the accords which ended the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

The Kissinger Commission report on pages 107 and 108 makes a very significant reference to the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, which ended the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 by requiring the Soviets to remove their offensive weapons from Cuba. The report reaffirms President Kennedy's important warning to the Soviets and the Cubans on November 20, 1962:

"If all [Soviet] offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean."

But the Soviets have reportedly brought bombers, fighter-bombers, and strategic submarines and support bases back into Cuba. These forces have more nuclear delivery capability than the Soviet missiles and bombers discovered in October 1982. The Soviets reportedly also have a combat brigade, nuclear warhead storage facilities, and even biological warfare facilities in Cuba.

The Kissinger Commission report points out the consequences for Inter-American security of the failure of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of prevent Soviet-Cuban offensive bases and aggression in the region:

[Kennedy's warning] was more than an expectation. It was a declared policy objective of the United States. Obviously, it has not been achieved. The problem has been that is [i.e., the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement] was eroded incrementally... the total effect of such small changes, however, has been—over five Administrations of both parties—an enormously increased mili-

June 29, 1954

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 7679

tary power and capacity for aggression concentrated on the island of Cuba, and the projection of that threat into Central America.

Senator McClellan, Senator Helms, and I have been the leaders in the Senate pointing out the dangers of the Soviet-Cuban military bases and aggression in violation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, both to American security and to the security of the Western Hemisphere. I believe that President Reagan should enforce Soviet compliance with the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement by requiring the Soviets to remove their nuclear delivery-capable bombers and submarines and other offensive military forces from Cuba, and to stop using Cuba as a military base for the export of revolution in Central America.

Thus all seven of JIM McCLELLAN's original accusations of Soviet SALT violations have either been confirmed by President Reagan, or have strong official support. I believe that Senator JIM McCLELLAN is, therefore, a very credible spokesman on Soviet SALT violations.

Mr. President, even the Arms Control Association has conceded that: "Violations of arms control agreements cannot be overlooked or excused." Thus even the most extreme arms control advocates realize the significance of the Soviet SALT violations. If detente and arms control have failed to restrain the Soviet strategic buildup in the 1970's and 1980's, are appeasement or war out only alternatives? We have to recognize the failure of detente before we can begin to shape a new policy for peaceful relations with the Soviets.

APPEASEMENT IN THE 1920'S AND 1930'S COMPARED TO THE 1970'S

Mr. President, there are compelling reasons to compare the period of the 1970's and 1980's, the period of detente and its aftermath, to the interwar period of the 1920's and 1930's. Many astute observers have noticed striking but alarming parallels between these two periods of modern history.

The disarmament provisions of the 1921 Treaty of Versailles were unpopular with the German people, because they were generally considered to be unfair by the German people. Thus there was popular German support for evasion measures, which the German army, the Reichswehr, devised. The democratic German Weimar and the British and French Governments knew about some of these German Army evasions, circumventions, and even outright violations of the Versailles Treaty, but the civilian leaders looked the other way. Many leaders of the Weimar Republic shared the perception that the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty were unfair to Germany. These German leaders saw these disarmament provisions as designed to keep Germany in a permanently inferior position to the allies, rather than permitting the Ger-

mans to function as an equal with the other powers of Europe, a position to which most Germans felt entitled by reason of Germany's economic, educational, scientific, and technological prowess. In the view of those German military and political leaders who violated the disarmament provisions of Versailles, or who covered up such violations, the fact that neither the British nor the French tried to enforce German disarmament justified Germany in its resistance to the disarmament provisions.

The result of this situation was that Germany was able to take actions which clearly violated the disarmament provisions of Versailles, and the allies did not even attempt enforcement. The Allies did little or nothing about the German violations. In most cases, the German Government blandly denied that disarmament violations were taking place, and the denials were accepted, especially by the British, at face value as true. The Allied Control Commission met evasions and passive resistance in many of its attempts to inspect illegal German munitions factories, and was continually thwarted in its attempts to monitor the German Army.

Mr. President, eventually the Allied political leaders, and even the Allied military establishments, increasingly accepted German protestations either that specific violations had not taken place, or that they were being corrected.

The Weimar policy of evading, circumventing, and violating their obligations under the Versailles Treaty enabled the Germans to lay the groundwork for the expansion of their army, to keep their munitions industry in being, to create and expand their air force and navy, and to establish the foundation for the expansion of their munitions industry supporting their illegal army, air force, and navy.

These objectives were accomplished in the early 1920's, ironically, with the active help and complicity of the Soviet Union.

The Inter-Allied Control Commission that supervised the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty withdrew from Germany in January 1927, and issued a final report stating:

Germany has never disarmed, has never had the intention of disarming, and for seven years has done everything in her power to deceive and "counter-control" the Commission appointed to control her disarmament.

Does this remind us of Soviet behavior in the 1970's and 1980's? As Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle testified to the House Armed Services Committee on February 22, 1984:

We must, if we are not to face an expanding pattern of Soviet violations, see that such violations carry costs at least equal to the gains they derive from them.

In 1934, Sir Winston Churchill also challenged the British Government over whether or not the Germans were

complying with the arms control provisions of the Versailles Treaty. In the House of Commons, Churchill stated that:

The worst crime is not to tell the truth to the public, and I think we must ask the Government to assure us that Germany has observed and is observing her treaty obligations in respect to military aviation.

Unfortunately, the British Government lied to the British people, and did assure the British people, contrary to the facts of German rearmament, that Hitler was not violating the Versailles Treaty. Thus, Britain slept until it was too late to avoid World War II.

In the summer of 1935, high-ranking naval officers of Hitler's Germany approached officials of the British Government with a one-time offer. The Nazis promised to limit their surface naval fleet to one-third the size of the British fleet, if only Germany could have 100 percent of Britain's submarine tonnage. Ignoring the fact that the Nazis were already in violation of the 1921 Versailles Treaty ending World War I by having any navy at all, the British eagerly grasped the Nazi straw. The Germans began producing U-boats, and the grim story of Nazi aggression unchecked by democratic military power led to World War II.

Barton Whaley summarized the effects of Axis arms control breaches and the failure of allied enforcement measures before World War II:

The national leaders were easy prey for deception. By failing to demand rigorous verification of alleged infractions they showed apathy. By failing to apply sanctions when intelligence did occasionally bring undeniable proof of infractions to their attention, they showed themselves impotent as well. And the opponents' perception of this impotence was a spur of even more audacious infractions.

Thus, U.S. failure to enforce Soviet arms control compliance or U.S. failure to take countermeasures can again lead to world war.

Arms control violations in the 1930's actually contributed to the outbreak of World War II. In the 1920's, clear evidence of Japanese and German violation of the naval treaties was not challenged by the West. Technical defects in the treaties, loopholes or ambiguous intelligence evidence were not responsible for the West's failure to challenge the violations. Bad policy and weak will were responsible.

Today, we face an increasingly clear pattern of Soviet violations of existing arms control treaties. American failure to challenge these Soviet violations will be more dangerous than any other course of action because an American failure of nerve will only encourage more aggressive Soviet violations.

Is this history of appeasement going to be repeated? Is another great Western democracy—this time America—turning its face away from serious treaty violations on the part of an aggressive totalitarian regime? Far

S 7680

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 10, 1984

graver potential consequences for the fate of the world are now at stake.

Mr. President, I am confident that we can avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. The best way to keep the peace is through continued deterrence and through enforcement of Soviet compliance with existing arms control treaties.

AFTER DETECTION, WHAT?

On July 18, 1979, even the Carter administration's Defense Secretary Harold Brown testified on the consequences of possible Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

In considering Soviet compliance with the provisions of SALT II . . . there is a difference between detection of a violation and enforcement, bringing a detected violation to an end. The SALT II Treaty will not be enforced in the courts . . . The issue is not whether we could prove a case to a jury. We do not need proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even evidence we can discuss in detail, to challenge Soviet action. In international agreements, the ultimate enforcement mechanism is our own actions. . . . We could insist on taking certain actions ourselves outside the Treaty to compensate militarily and politically for the violation. Our ultimate remedy would be termination of (the) SALT II Agreement . . . If a problem were not resolved or if we detected a violation which threatened our security, I would not hesitate to recommend to the President . . . the ultimate step of Treaty abrogation.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger long ago stated what the United States should do in the case of Soviet SALT violations. Dr. Kissinger warned Senators and Congressmen on June 15, 1972:

The possibility exists that the Soviets will treat the Moscow Agreements (SALT II) as they have sometimes treated earlier ones, as just another tactical opportunity in the protracted conflict. If this happens, the United States will have to respond. If this agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field.

During the decade since SALT I, the Soviets have in fact circumvented and violated all the most important provisions of SALT I and SALT II, just as they violated most treaties since 1917. I wonder whether the United States may now need to fulfill Dr. Kissinger's pledge to take countermeasures.

Addressing Congress after signing the SALT II Treaty in June 1979, former President Carter stated:

Were the Soviet Union to take the enormous risk of trying to violate the treaty in any way that might affect the strategic balance, there is no doubt that we would discover it in time to respond fully and effectively.

Thus even former President Carter promised to take responsive countermeasures to offset Soviet SALT II violations.

What is remarkable about President Reagan's report on Soviet SALT violations is the fact that the Reagan administration plans to continue complying with all the six arms control treaties which the Soviets are violating, including two unratified treaties.

Even more remarkable is the fact that the Reagan administration plans to make absolutely no changes in its military budget or defense programs to offset the military implications of the Soviet cheating. An objective observer must conclude either that the Soviet arms control cheating has no military significance at all, or alternatively, that U.S. strategic programs are so robust already that they inherently compensate for any Soviet cheating.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS

I would like to discuss each of these alternatives in sequence. First, I believe that the Soviet cheating does have profound military significance. In fact, Soviet arms control cheating has decisive military significance. In particular, the illegal Soviet biological and chemical offensive warfare capabilities have the effect of severely lowering the nuclear threshold, making attempted U.S. nuclear deterrence of the Soviet BW/CW capability more likely to result in nuclear war. Moreover, the President's report states for the first time in public that the Soviets have maintained "an offensive biological warfare program and capabilities." This is extremely dangerous to world peace, because these weapons are nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction.

The illegal Soviet SS-X-25 and the illegal SS-16 are both mobile ICBM's, and up to 400 of these mobile missiles may be deployed. They are very survivable and therefore of high military significance. This many of these two ICBM's could carry over 800 warheads. The illegally encrypted SS-X-24 will carry over 1,000 additional counterforce warheads if only 100 are deployed, or 2,000 warheads if 200 are deployed. If the SS-X-24 can carry 14 warheads each, like the SS-18, then 200 could carry 2,800 warheads. The encryption of the SS-X-24 suggests this kind of throw-weight and payload.

The illegal Soviet ABM radars will, along with mobile interceptors, significantly contribute to an illegal Soviet nationwide ABM defense, making it extremely significant militarily. Indeed, over 30 percent of Soviet ICBM warheads can be defended.

Finally, the Soviet violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty probably allowed the Soviets to develop more powerful warheads for their new even more highly accurate ICBM's, also making this very significant militarily.

Thus it is reasonable to conclude that at least five of the nine Soviet arms control violations reported by the President are militarily significant.

Second, are U.S. military programs already robust enough to compensate for the military implications of the Soviet violations?

The defense and military posture statements for fiscal years 1981 through 1985 indicate that the U.S. strategic decline will not even begin to be arrested until after 1990, and if

Soviet strategic advantages continue to accelerate, the United States may never return to strategic parity with the Soviets. It is thus reasonable to conclude that U.S. military programs are not now robust enough to offset the Soviet strategic advantages gained from their arms control cheating.

More significantly, President Reagan has already conceded the first point, that there are military implications of the Soviet violations, in his report on Soviet arms control cheating. President Reagan stated: "Soviet violations of arms control agreements could create new security risks."

Even more ominously, President Reagan stated:

Such violations deprive us of the security benefits of arms control directly because of the military consequences of known violations and indirectly by inducing suspicion about the existence of undetected violations that might have additional military consequences.

These statements concede that U.S. national security has in fact been harmed by the Soviet cheating. Thus, the only question is how to measure these military implications of the Soviet SALT violations.

And, as President Reagan stated on January 16, 1984:

We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control.

This statement means implicitly that the Soviet SALT violations have military implications that may not have been factored into our defense programs.

At the very least, the full funding of President Reagan's strategic weapons program is essential in view of their confirmed violations. The President's strategic weapons program itself is quite modest, even in comparison to the strategic program planned by former President Carter.

ARE WE IN A NUCLEAR FREEZE ALREADY?

For example, the Department of Defense budget request for last year, fiscal year 1984, called for production of zero air-launched cruise missiles B, ALCM-B. The fiscal year 1984 defense request also planned to zero production of the Trident I submarine-launched ballistic missile, SLEB, in fiscal year 1985. Last year, however, Congress increased ALCM-B production for fiscal year 1984 from zero to 240.

The fiscal year 1985 Defense budget request again entirely cancels the production of ALCM-B and reaffirms the planned zeroing of Trident I SLEB production this year. These are the only two strategic offensive weapons systems which are currently produced for operational deployment by the United States.

I know that ALCM-B production has been curtailed because of plans for an advanced cruise missile, and Trident I production has similarly been curtailed because of plans for Trident II

June 20, 1984

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 7681

production. But Trident II is still only in the design phase and cannot become operational until 1989 at the earliest. And the ACM will also take several years to become operational.

There will thus be a gap of at least several years between the 1985 production stoppage of both of these two missiles before their successor missiles can finish R&D testing and achieve initial operational capability and begin production.

Thus the perception could be created that the Reagan administration is observing a "nuclear weapons freeze" by cancelling production of the only two strategic offensive systems now being produced and deployed. But the Senate soundly defeated the Kennedy-Hatfield "nuclear weapons freeze" resolution last October, by a vote of 58 to 40.

Perhaps the United States should continue ALCM-B and Trident I SLBM production until production can begin on the ACM and Trident II. More than just 12 of the 31 Poseidon SLBM submarines could be equipped with the Trident I SLBM, thereby increasing their survivability during the dangerous "window of vulnerability." Up to 20 ALCM-B's could be deployed on each of the 120 B-52 bombers equipped with cruise missiles allowed by SALT II. It may be unwise to have a production gap for both of our only currently deployed new systems in these precarious times of apparent Soviet breakout from SALT I and II.

I know that tight budgetary constraints are the main reason for the apparently premature production stoppages, but this constraint may demonstrate either that our defense program priorities could be wrong or that we may need somewhat more defense funding in selected areas.

Continued U.S. unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty may also be a factor in the case of ALCM-B production, because the United States is allowed no more than 120 ALCM-equipped bombers, and we reportedly now have planned 90 B-52's, each equipped with only 12 ALCM-B's.

I would now like to describe the Reagan strategic build-down in some detail. Despite the popular myths, the Reagan administration is unilaterally freezing and building down.

The July 1980 Republican platform stated:

Despite clear danger signals indicating that Soviet nuclear power would overtake that of the United States by the early 1980's, threatening the survival of the United States and making possible, for the first time in postwar history, political coercion and defeat, the [Carter] administration reduced the size and capabilities of our nuclear forces. (Emphasis added.)

The platform went on to say:

... Unilateral restraint by the United States has failed to bring reductions by the Soviet Union ... [the Carter administration] has ... practiced unilateral disarmament and removed any incentives for the Soviets to negotiate for what they could ob-

viously achieve by waiting. (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, in March 1981, President Reagan stated that the Soviets have:

Sat on the other side of the table so far, knowing that we have unilaterally disarmed to a great extent ... maybe if we do a little building—it'll be a two-way street.

But the following tables illustrate the fact that, despite the above 1980 platform commitments and early Reagan statement, the United States has continued under President Reagan to reduce our strategic forces unilaterally, and thus has continued to practice unilateral restraint and unilateral disarmament. Prior to even beginning Strategic Arms Reduction Talks—START—the Reagan administration has made or planned the following unilateral reductions:

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STRATEGIC FORCE CUT BACKS

(Decreases covered by current or previous strategy nuclear delivery vehicles)

	Vehicles	Megatons
100 Minuteman II ICBMs (replacement)	54	54
700 Titan I ICBMs	150	150
Polaris SLBMs	80	320
B-52-D bombers	48	384
2 Trident subs	150	3,000
B-1 bombers	32	1,024
2 Poseidon subs	90	1,800
90 B-52G ALCM carriers	100	1,000
MX ICBMs	720	5,760
Total	720	5,760

* Polaris deactivation began under Carter but was completed under Reagan.
* The United States currently plans only 100 B-1-B bombers as compared to 150 planned by Carter.
* The United States currently plans only 100 unserviceable MX's as compared to 150 serviceable MX's planned by Carter.

SUMMARY OF CONTINUED U.S. STRATEGIC CUTBACKS UNDER DEFENSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER, 1981-83

ICBM's

No deployment of 100 stockpiled Minuteman II's despite its authorization by Congress in FY 1981 and 1982, and appropriation in FY 1982.

No upgrade of Minuteman power and airborne launch control.

Reduction in MX from 200 to only 100 deployed missiles, in non-survivable basing mode, with no ABM defense. (Only 40 MX's were planned at one point.)

Premature and abrupt deactivation of 52 Titan II's, carrying a high percentage—33 percent—of our ICBM megatonnage.

SLBM's

Continued Polaris submarine deactivation—loss of 160 high megatonnage SLBMs—25 percent of our SLBM megatonnage.

Cutback of two Trident submarines.

Reduction of Trident construction rate from 1½ to 1 per year.

Delay to 1992 completion of Kings Bay Trident sub base.

One-year delay in ELF deployment decision, with Initial Operational Capability further delayed to 1988.

Delay and cutback in SLCM deployment on submarines.

Planned deactivation of two Poseidon subs carrying 32 SLBMs.

BOMBERS AND ALCM's

Premature and abrupt deactivation of 80 B-52D's, carrying heavy megatonnage—19 percent of our bomber megatonnage.

Reduction of ALCM yearly production rate first from 430 to 440, then to 360, then to 240, then to zero, delay of B-52 ALCM

initial operational capability one year to December 1982.

Cancellation of HC-10 tanker aircraft procurement.

Planned B-1 force cut from 250 under Ford to only 190.

Failure to deploy sufficient ALCMs on B-1, reduction to SALT II limit of only 20 ALCMs per B-1, or by 200 ALCMs.

No inland basing and increased alert rate for B-52 force.

Reduction of B-52 alert rate from 30% to 25%, concurrent with acceptance of additional conventional sea control and projection missions for some B-52's.

Planned deactivation of 90 B-52 G's carrying over 1,000 ALCMs.

DEFENSE

Reduction of proposed funding for space laser research development.

Reduction of Patriot Air Defense missile system.

No acceleration of ABM R&D.

The net effect of this is that the Reagan strategic program will have fewer weapons than the Carter strategic program throughout the 1980's and into the early 1990's. The effectiveness of the bomber improvements will be reduced by the fact that they will mainly carry gravity bombs, rather than advanced penetration weapons and cruise missiles.

Moreover, the ramp Reagan MX program has yet to be given a survivable basing mode—and it is very unlikely that the Reagan administration will ever come up with a really viable alternative to the multiple protective structure basing mode.

Under Secretary of Defense Richard DeLauer testified to the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on March 13, 1984, that:

The foundation of our strategy and program is built on the adequacy of our strategic nuclear forces to deter aggression or coercion, thus denying the Soviets the opportunity to checkmate us through nuclear dominance. The opportunities for modern conventional defense depend upon this foundation having been established.

DeLauer added that "the President's No. 1 priority is strategic modernization." This testimony seems refuted by the strategic cutbacks noted above.

Thus we must conclude that the Soviet cheating does have military significance, and that the Soviets already have strategic superiority over the United States.

As President Reagan said on March 31, 1982: "The Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority—enough so there is risk, and there is what I have called a window of vulnerability." President Reagan again stated in his speech to the Nation on the MX ICBM on November 22, 1982, that the United States is inferior to the U.S.S.R. in strategic capability. On March 23, 1983, President Reagan further declared that the Soviets had a "present margin of superiority."

Defense Secretary Weinberger stated in the fiscal year 1984 defense posture statement that "the Soviets have acquired a margin of nuclear su-

S 7552

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1984

priority in most important categories."

Using only SALT counting rules, which significantly underestimate Soviet capabilities by an order of magnitude, and do not account for the Soviet violations, Soviet strategic force numerical advantages are: 1.6 to 1 in SALT-accountable delivery vehicles; 4 to 1 in missile throw-weight; 1 to .9 in strategic warheads; 6 to 1 in prompt hard target kill potential; 4 to 1 in equivalent megatons; and 1300 to 24 in long-range theater nuclear missiles warheads.

These Soviet advantages will persist well beyond 1990, because even the first U.S. MX ICBM's and B-1B bombers will not become operational until late 1986 and 1987.

Soviet military leaders confirm that they believe that the "correlation of forces" shifted in their favor as early as 1971. In fact, the Soviet military journal, Red Star, stated in January

1980 that the "correlation of forces" had shifted "irrevocably" in Soviet favor.

SUMMARY OF MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS

The following chart is a summary of President Reagan's report to Congress on Soviet SALT violations, together with a summary of the status of most of the other Soviet arms control compliance issues which Senator McClure, Senator Symms and I have cataloged for the Senate. As is easily apparent from the chart, there are over 40 Soviet SALT and other arms control violations remaining for President Reagan to report on to the Congress, in order to comply fully with the McClure-Helms-Symms amendment to Public Law 98-262, which states:

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Sec. 5. The President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on the

record of the compliance or noncompliance of the Soviet Union with existing arms control agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party.

The above McClure-Helms-Symms amendment passed the Senate on September 23, 1983, by a rollcall vote of 93 to 0. The legislative history of the amendment in the Senate is that Soviet compliance with the letter and spirit of all arms control agreements should be reported and that this report should be unclassified and made on an urgent basis. As Assistant Defense Secretary Perle testified to the Senate on March 14, 1984, the President's violation report was illustrative only, and Perle mentioned 20 to 25 additional existing violations.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that chart and summary previously mentioned be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the chart and summary were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET SALT AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL TREATY VIOLATIONS

Soviet Arms Control Treaty Violation	Consequences of President's statement	Quality of evidence	Soviet McClure-Helms-Symms provision	When violations or compliance items
Self-deception of missile telemetry	Violation of legal obligation prior to 1981 and violation of this protocol commitment subsequent to 1981, unclassified	Conclusive, 100 percent encryption or denial, absolutely precise verification	Confirm prediction	Unknown, could allow the SS-9-24 to have heavier throw-weight than the SS-18, and carry up to 14 warheads, but the SS-18
SS-9-24 as second type ICBM	"Probable violation of political commitment," using new estimates, SS-9-24 has about 20 percent more throw-weight than SS-18	Strong	Confirm prediction of about 20 percent increase of SS-9-24 throw-weight over SS-18	After Mirling of SS-9-24
Heavy vehicle to throw-weight ratio	"Violation of political commitment," unclassified	Conclusive	Overlook the actual	Could allow SS-9-24 to carry more warheads with a reduction of SS-9-24 throw-weight to 80 percent of SS-18
SS-18 mobile ICBM launcher	"Probable violation of legal obligation as to dates for construction and increase of SALT II prior to 1981 . . . probable violation of a political commitment subsequent to 1981"	Strong, covering non-military designs	Confirm prediction of SS-18 launcher	Probably results in 20 service warheads
SALT I ASM new large range	"After carefully a violation of legal obligation"	After conclusion	Confirm prediction of multiple test provisions	Could test several as to 20 percent of Soviet ICBM warheads, about 1400
Prohibit test ban freeze	"Clear violation of legal obligation"	Offering interpretation and source of material	Prediction of 80 percent compliance of warheads or is confirmed	Could allow construction of new warheads as to 100 percent of SS-18 warheads
Soviet Union and Central Warhead Data	"Unclassified violation of legal obligation," unclassified	Conclusive	Confirm prediction	SS-9-24 are warheads of high destruction. Lowering of nuclear threshold. Soviet after construction denies construction. Confirms offensive SS-9-24 program capabilities. Increase probability of surprise attack.
SALT II SS-18 rank test and refine count	Unconfirmed by President	Strong	Unconfirmed	300 extra missiles, one 100 additional warheads
AS-3 Mangrove long-range ASM on 100 T-10-95	Unconfirmed by President. Soviet military power September, 1981 states or says that the AS-3 Mangrove has a range of "650 kilometers." The AS-3 that counts in SALT II	Unconfirmed and official	x	Majority
Deployment of anti-missile ASM and cruise missile or bomber bomber	Unconfirmed by President	Strong	x	250 more strategic heavy warheads and warheads
Production of SS-18 SS-20 SS-24 SS-25 SS-26 SS-27 SS-28 SS-29 SS-30 SS-31 SS-32 SS-33 SS-34 SS-35 SS-36 SS-37 SS-38 SS-39 SS-40 SS-41 SS-42 SS-43 SS-44 SS-45 SS-46 SS-47 SS-48 SS-49 SS-50 SS-51 SS-52 SS-53 SS-54 SS-55 SS-56 SS-57 SS-58 SS-59 SS-60 SS-61 SS-62 SS-63 SS-64 SS-65 SS-66 SS-67 SS-68 SS-69 SS-70 SS-71 SS-72 SS-73 SS-74 SS-75 SS-76 SS-77 SS-78 SS-79 SS-80 SS-81 SS-82 SS-83 SS-84 SS-85 SS-86 SS-87 SS-88 SS-89 SS-90 SS-91 SS-92 SS-93 SS-94 SS-95 SS-96 SS-97 SS-98 SS-99 SS-100	x	x	x	Soviet strategic delivery vehicle total increases 30 to 50 per year
Active development of Russian counter	x	x	x	Baseline for arms control talks to attack upon United States
Increased and large scale strategic camouflage concealment and deception	x	x	x	Can not be determined. Affects U.S. targeting in intelligence work
Testing new heavy SS-9-24	x	x	x	Could allow test target capacity SS-9-24 or more than the allowed 14 warheads of SS-9-24
Soviet aircraft that the Soviet SS-18 SS-20 SS-24 SS-25 SS-26 SS-27 SS-28 SS-29 SS-30 SS-31 SS-32 SS-33 SS-34 SS-35 SS-36 SS-37 SS-38 SS-39 SS-40 SS-41 SS-42 SS-43 SS-44 SS-45 SS-46 SS-47 SS-48 SS-49 SS-50 SS-51 SS-52 SS-53 SS-54 SS-55 SS-56 SS-57 SS-58 SS-59 SS-60 SS-61 SS-62 SS-63 SS-64 SS-65 SS-66 SS-67 SS-68 SS-69 SS-70 SS-71 SS-72 SS-73 SS-74 SS-75 SS-76 SS-77 SS-78 SS-79 SS-80 SS-81 SS-82 SS-83 SS-84 SS-85 SS-86 SS-87 SS-88 SS-89 SS-90 SS-91 SS-92 SS-93 SS-94 SS-95 SS-96 SS-97 SS-98 SS-99 SS-100	x	x	x	Soviet have 450 more strategic delivery vehicles than allowed, carrying 100 more warheads than allowed
Soviet failure to reduce to 2400 or to 1200 SS-9-24 SS-24 SS-25 SS-26 SS-27 SS-28 SS-29 SS-30 SS-31 SS-32 SS-33 SS-34 SS-35 SS-36 SS-37 SS-38 SS-39 SS-40 SS-41 SS-42 SS-43 SS-44 SS-45 SS-46 SS-47 SS-48 SS-49 SS-50 SS-51 SS-52 SS-53 SS-54 SS-55 SS-56 SS-57 SS-58 SS-59 SS-60 SS-61 SS-62 SS-63 SS-64 SS-65 SS-66 SS-67 SS-68 SS-69 SS-70 SS-71 SS-72 SS-73 SS-74 SS-75 SS-76 SS-77 SS-78 SS-79 SS-80 SS-81 SS-82 SS-83 SS-84 SS-85 SS-86 SS-87 SS-88 SS-89 SS-90 SS-91 SS-92 SS-93 SS-94 SS-95 SS-96 SS-97 SS-98 SS-99 SS-100	x	Conclusive	x	Allow the Soviet more than 550 delivery vehicles carrying more than 550 warheads
SALT I ASM new large range	Unconfirmed by President, confirmed by Soviet Secretary of State Gorbachev and former Defense Secretary Laird	Strong	x	Could allow Soviet to break 100 percent of the SS-9-24 warheads, put any extra areas
ASM Capability and constraints	Unconfirmed by President	x	x	Majority
Reduction of ASM destruction	Confirmed under President Carter	Conclusive	Confirm	None
Creation of new ASM test range without required prior notification	x	x	x	None
Development of a ready deployable, mobile ASM system	Unconfirmed by President	Strong	Unconfirmed	Could continue to interfere from any view
Testing of a ready deployable ASM capability	x	x	x	Do
Development of a ready deployable ASM defense, using SS-9-24 SS-24 SS-25 SS-26 SS-27 SS-28 SS-29 SS-30 SS-31 SS-32 SS-33 SS-34 SS-35 SS-36 SS-37 SS-38 SS-39 SS-40 SS-41 SS-42 SS-43 SS-44 SS-45 SS-46 SS-47 SS-48 SS-49 SS-50 SS-51 SS-52 SS-53 SS-54 SS-55 SS-56 SS-57 SS-58 SS-59 SS-60 SS-61 SS-62 SS-63 SS-64 SS-65 SS-66 SS-67 SS-68 SS-69 SS-70 SS-71 SS-72 SS-73 SS-74 SS-75 SS-76 SS-77 SS-78 SS-79 SS-80 SS-81 SS-82 SS-83 SS-84 SS-85 SS-86 SS-87 SS-88 SS-89 SS-90 SS-91 SS-92 SS-93 SS-94 SS-95 SS-96 SS-97 SS-98 SS-99 SS-100	x	x	x	Could put Soviet in better position and a capability to achieve U.S. retaliatory deterrent
Deployment of more than 100 ASM launchers abroad Moscow	x	x	x	Majority, would significant number of extra launchers
SALT II program agreement	Unconfirmed by President. Confirmed as a central violation by former Defense Secretary Laird and as "major problem" by former Secretary of State Alexander	Conclusive	x	Allow Soviet to add 1800 hard target warheads, up from 1400 hard warheads in this force
Failure to restrict on SS-9-24 or SS-24 and continued production of official Russian reports	Unconfirmed by President	x	x	Allow Soviet to offset Russian and the rest of U.S. nuclear warheads with a reduction, plus 500 extra warheads in Soviet inventory

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET SALT AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL TREATY VIOLATIONS—Continued

Soviet Arms Control Treaty Violation	Confirmation of President Reagan's Statement	Details of Violation	Soviet Response to U.S. Statement	U.S. Response to Soviet Statement
Shipping more ICBM components to Soviet Union	do	Strong	do	None
Receiving 18 SS-9 ICBMs at an ICBM test range facility	Confirmed by President	Conclusive	do	Gave Soviet 18 ICBMs with 18 extra
Soviet deployment of SS-9 ICBMs with a configuration too similar to U.S. mobile launchers	Unconfirmed by President	do	do	None
Increased use of camouflage, concealment, deception, concealment of ICBM, SLBM, and SSBN launchers	do	do	do	Allow Soviet to increase U.S. coverage of Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and SSBN launchers
Continuing use of SS-9 ICBMs, some of which were SS-9 ICBMs	do	do	do	Allow Soviet to increase U.S. coverage of Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and SSBN launchers
Violation of Brezhnev's pledge not to build mobile ICBMs	do	Strong	do	See President's report
Declaring SS-11 ICBMs at SS-4 ICBM sites to Soviet test sites	do	do	do	Could show over 1,000 SS-11 ICBMs with 1,000 warheads to be covered by U.S. defense as a strategic force
Receiving about 1,200 to several thousand old ICBMs, converted to new Soviet test launch and road mobile sites for ICBMs	do	do	do	1,700 to 1,800 more old ICBMs and warheads as Soviet strategic force
Marshall-Andropov Agreement Cancel	President Reagan and CIA Director, US Dept. of State, and Under Secretary of Defense have confirmed Soviet position	Conclusive	Confirmed	Soviet offensive ground forces capability in East
Gulf and other tests	do	do	do	12 SSBNs and 12 SLBNs
Missile program	do	do	do	12 SSBNs and 12 SLBNs
TU-95s	do	do	do	12 SSBNs and 12 SLBNs
SSBN capability	do	do	do	12 SSBNs and 12 SLBNs

OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT DATA FROM JCS POSTURE STATEMENT, AND SOVIET MILITARY POWER

	Number	Warheads
United States		
Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles		
ICBM	1,063	2,140
SLBM	592	5,312
Intercontinental bombers	254	1,344
Total	1,889	9,421
Soviet Union		
Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles		
ICBM	1,320	5,370
SLBM	981	2,529
Intercontinental bombers	405	1,520
Total	2,706	10,419

Using SALT II counting rules, Soviets are thus 895 delivery vehicles and 1,077 warheads ahead of the United States. But U.S. forces should be discounted further because 480 Russian warheads are declared to NATO.

TOTAL SOVIET QUANTITATIVE ADVANTAGES PROBABLY GAINED FROM VIOLATING SALT I, II, AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

	Delivery Vehicles	Warheads
SS-9 ICBMs	200	1,200
SS-11 ICBMs	200	600
SS-13 ICBMs	200	600
SS-14 ICBMs	300	1,200
Bombers	250	1,344
MIRV'd launchers over 1,000	450	1,350
Delivery vehicles over 1,200	550	1,350
SS-13 and SS-14	0	1,200
SS-13 and SS-14	18	18
SS-13 and SS-14	170	170
SS-13 and SS-14	1,000	1,000
SS-13 and SS-14	1,000	1,000
SS-13 and SS-14	12	12
SS-13 and SS-14	43	43
Total	2,566	12,553

1,200 warheads

SOVIET VIOLATION OF ALL SALT II CEILINGS

Mr. SYMMS. The following series of tables illustrate the Soviet strategic forces structure as it exceeds the SALT II Treaty ceilings. The first series of tables shows that the Soviets are well over all the five SALT II ceilings: 2,400, 2,250, 1,320, 1,200, 820. The second series of tables illustrates Soviet strategic missile and bomber construction rates since 1978. These total 7,017. There is no evidence that

any of the older missiles and bombers which this total replaces have been dismantled. Hence the Soviet strategic force could be an order of magnitude larger than the first set of SALT II tables indicate. And as the preceding SALT violations chart indicates, the Soviets may already be an order of magnitude above the SALT II limits. There is some double counting in the charts, but it is fair to conclude that the Soviet strategic force is an order of magnitude larger than SALT II allows.

Soviet strategic force structure as it exceeds the SALT II Treaty ceilings

Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under SALT II counting rules:	
ICBM silos	1,398
Bear, Bison bombers (counting tankers)	170
SLBNs	980
Vice 2,400 and 2,250 allowed by SALT II	2,543
Backfire bombers, including Naval Backfires	235
Subtotal	2,783
Bear H with ALCMs	50
SS-13 mobile launchers at Plesetsk	200
SS-9 FOBs at Tyuratam	18
Stockpiled ICBMs for rapid refire and covert launch	1,000
Total SNEVs	4,051

MIRV'd ICBMs under SALT II counting rules:

SS-13	303
SS-19	360
SS-17	150
Subtotal	813
SS-24 in converted SS-11 silos operational by 1985	100
Vice 920 allowed by SALT II	913

MIRV'd SLBNs under SALT II counting rules:

16 Delta III's with SS-N-18	264
3 Delta III's under construction	48
2 Typhoons with SS-N-30	40

2 Typhoons under construction	40
Total	392

Total MIRV'd ICBM and SLBM launchers under SALT II counting rules:

MIRV'd ICBM	918
MIRV'd SLBM	392
Vice 1,200 allowed by SALT II	1,310

Intercontinental bombers equipped with long-range ALCMs or ASMs and MIRV'd missile launchers under SALT II counting rules:

Bear with 650 kilometer AS-3	105
Backfire with long-range ALCM	235
New Bear H with long-range ALCM, the AS-X-15 having 3,000 kilometer range	50
Subtotal	390

Vice 1,320 allowed by SALT II

The fiscal year 1975 JCS military posture statement gives the Soviets 2,754 delivery vehicles, counting Backfires.

Does not count over 100 more SS-24's which might be deployed in a mobile mode. In fact, the April 1984 "Soviet Military Power" states: "Available evidence suggests mobile as well as silo deployment for both (SS-24 and SS-25) systems."

Does not count up to 200 SS-25's as MIRV'd and up to 20 SS-24's.

Note—These totals include those launchers and bombers under construction, which SALT II art. XI specifies should count. Moreover, those delivery vehicles under construction will probably be operational before SALT II expires at the end of 1985.

These totals probably underestimate the real Soviet SALT II breakout, because they do not count reports that the SS-25 is MIRV'd, and they do not count reports of up to 300 probable rail-mobile SS-24's, road mobile SS-25's, and silo based SS-25's.

SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPON PRODUCTION RATES

This table shows new Soviet strategic weapon production rates. It is derived from the Defense Department books "Soviet Military Power" for 1983 and 1984. It is especially worrisome because old Soviet weapons are not being retired as new ones are pro-

S 7684

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 26, 1984

duced. They are being stockpiled as strategic reserves.

ICBM's:

1978.....	235
1979.....	235
1980.....	250
1981.....	200
1982.....	175
1983.....	150

Total.....	1,225
------------	-------

SLEM's:

1978.....	250
1979.....	200
1980.....	200
1981.....	175
1982.....	175
1983.....	200

Total.....	1,200
------------	-------

SLCM's:

1978.....	600
1979.....	700
1980.....	750
1981.....	750
1982.....	800
1983.....	800

Total.....	4,400
------------	-------

Bombers (Backfire):

1978.....	30
1979.....	30
1980.....	30
1981.....	30
1982.....	35
1983.....	35

Total.....	190
------------	-----

Note—In the April 1984 edition of "Soviet Military Power," the bomber production numbers for 1982 and 1983 were each changed from 30 to "35." This is the first official confirmation of Soviet production of more than 30 Backfire bombers per year.

I am very concerned by the military implications of the President's report on Soviet SALT violations for U.S. national security. Neither SALT I nor SALT II seems to be constraining the Soviet threat. We seem to be witnessing an apparent Soviet breakout from both the offensive and defensive constraints of SALT I and II.

PARALYSIS IN THE FACE OF SOVIET SALT BREAKOUT

I have noted in the Washington Post of January 19, 1984, that:

Senior Pentagon officials... say there is no need to alter U.S. military programs in the next few years as a result of the alleged Soviet cheating.

State Department public diplomacy policy guidance has also stated:

We are taking account of Soviet violations in our defense modernization plans... the Strategic Defense Initiative should be evaluated on its own merits aside from Soviet violations of existing agreements.

I wonder what specific U.S. strategic modernization programs will offset the Soviet SALT violations. As President Reagan stated in his speech of January 16, 1984:

We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control.

And as President Reagan stated in his report to Congress of Soviet SALT violations:

Soviet violations of arms control agreements could create new security risks. Such

violations deprive us of the security benefits of arms control directly because of the military consequences of known violations and indirectly by inducing suspicion about the existence of undetected violations that might have additional military consequences.

As Defense Secretary Weinberger stated on May 26, 1982, SALT II "did not reduce arms or even limit their effectiveness." Secretary Weinberger added that SALT II "would irreversibly seal the advantage the Soviets currently enjoy." Thus even if the Soviets were complying with the unequal SALT II Treaty, which the Senate Armed Services Committee stated was not in the national security interest of the United States, the United States would be at a grave disadvantage. Since 1979, the Soviets have increased the number of nuclear warheads targeted on the United States by about 75 percent. Now the Soviets seem to regard both SALT I and II to be dead, and the Soviet offensive and defensive threats seem to be unconstrained in this apparent breakout situation.

In determining whether or how to adapt our defense programs in response to apparent Soviet breakout from SALT I and II, we might recall what even the Carter Administration conceded were the budgetary implications of a Soviet threat unconstrained by SALT I and II. In a speech of October 20, 1980, former Defense Secretary Harold Brown argued that:

To match the bigger Soviet force without SALT could cost us, over the next decade, an additional 30 to 100 billion 1981 dollars.

Defense budget increases as large as the Carter administration considered in the absence of SALT I and II or in the event of Soviet SALT breakout are obviously difficult to envision, due to the huge deficits in the Federal budget, but they might be a guide to what we might wish we could do in this period of grave national security danger.

Mr. President, the process of the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT—have been an exceptionally complex process. The SALT treaties themselves clearly show how complex this process has been, because the treaties themselves are very complex. Nevertheless, there are some rather basic and easily understandable conclusions that I would like to draw from this sordid history of the SALT process. These conclusions are worthy of serious consideration by the Senate.

First, Mr. President, the Soviets have achieved major strategic advantages from their violations of SALT I and II:

They have deployed their illegal SS-19 heavy ICBM, helping to quintuple their counterforce capability;

They have achieved overwhelming superiority in the number and capabilities of ICBM's, SLEM's, and bombers, including superiority in the number of warheads carried on them;

They have deployed up to 200 illegal SS-16 mobile ICBM's;

They have excluded over 250 Backfire intercontinental bombers from SALT II;

They have excluded 1,000 to 2,000 strategic reserve stockpiled ICBM's from SALT II;

And finally, the Soviets have achieved through SALT I and II overall quantitative and qualitative offensive and defensive superiority. Not such a bad achievement for a supposedly mutually beneficial process.

Mr. President, the Soviets are committed to their 5-year defense plans, and they use the SALT process to preserve their long-term commitments to their new programs. The evidence from their exploitation of the SALT process clearly shows that the Soviets do not change their force plans because of SALT. Quite the contrary, Mr. President, the Soviets make their secret 5-year defense plans first and then they defend these secret plans from SALT constraints. In contrast, Mr. President, the United States has no long-term defense plan, and the United States allows SALT to adversely affect its strategic programs. So far, the SALT process has codified Soviet future defense plans, while impeding and constraining U.S. defense plans.

Mr. President, the open U.S. society versus the closed Soviet society has resulted in a severe intelligence asymmetry in the SALT process. This has been a severe handicap to real arms control. The SALT negotiations have been conducted using mostly U.S. data. This process can be compared to playing poker with an opponent who knows your cards as well as his own, and who also cheats.

The Soviet General Staff Deception Directorate has played a key role in SALT negotiating deception, camouflage and concealment, and SALT violations.

Mr. President, the Soviets have a sustained SALT camouflage, concealment, and deception program centrally directed by the Politburo-level Defense Council, and coordinated by the Soviet General Staff as part of the Soviet SALT negotiating strategy also largely controlled by the General Staff. Operational strategic deception and concealment is directly linked to negotiating deception and outright SALT violations. The Soviet leadership intended from the outset to violate the SALT treaties in 1972. The closed nature of Soviet society greatly magnifies the effectiveness of this massive program and further exacerbates the intelligence asymmetry.

Mr. President, the SALT decade can be accurately described as a decade of dangerous U.S. strategic decline, and the SALT process has strongly contributed to that decline. The SALT process has made America more insecure rather than more secure. No positive U.S. military or security objectives that have been achieved by SALT I or II can easily be identified.

The Carter administration consistently claimed both that the United States would be able to detect any significant Soviet SALT cheating, and more importantly, that the United States would react to it. For example, in their SALT compliance and verification white paper of February 1973, the Carter administration stated:

Although the possibility of some undetected cheating in certain areas exists, such cheating would not alter the strategic balance in favor of U.S. programs. Any cheating on a scale large enough to alter the strategic balance would be discovered in time to make an appropriate response. (Emphasis added.)

Thus the Carter administration clearly pledged that it would respond to Soviet SALT violations. It believed in "the U.S. ability to respond in a timely manner to possible Soviet cheating." But while the Reagan administration has accused the Soviets of violations, it is not yet ready to propose any U.S. response to Soviet SALT violations. At least President Reagan seems to believe that some U.S. response is necessary.

ANALYSIS OF CARTER WHITE PAPER ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE OF FEBRUARY 1973

The Carter administration reported that seven Soviet SALT compliance questions were discussed with the U.S.S.R. Rather than to recapitulate all of the details of each of the seven cases, I will point out some omissions or misleading aspects of the Carter administration report.

1. LAUNCH CONTROL SILOS

First, on the question of whether Soviet launch control silos were illegal ICBM launchers or not, it is important to note that the Soviet silos in question were first detected in 1970. This matter was not resolved in the SALT Standing Consultative Commission—SCC—until 1976, so it took 6 years to resolve this significant question of arms control compliance. The real issue all along was not the immediate function of the silos in question, but the similarity of their design to Soviet silos actually housing and launching ICBM silos. The Soviets designed these silos to be too similar to ICBM launch silos, hence the U.S. concern was caused by what can be regarded as Soviet deception inherent in their silo designs. And it is important to keep in mind just how this problem was resolved. As in all the other cases in the SCC, the United States acquiesced in the Soviet position.

2. SOVIET DECEPTION

The Carter administration claimed on the second issue that "in early 1975, careful analysis of intelligence information on—the camouflage and concealment—activities of the U.S.S.R. led the United States to conclude that there no longer appeared to be an expanding pattern of concealment activities associated with strategic weapons programs." (Emphasis added.) This statement is both misleading and false. It is misleading because the U.S. analysis of the Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception—CCD—pro-

gram was not careful. I believe that the United States still has a very primitive understanding of the nature, scale, intentions, and scope of the Soviet CCD program. It was not, for example, until mid-1978 that U.S. intelligence first realized that Soviet Marshal Ogarkov was in charge of strategic deception while he was also the chief Soviet military SALT negotiator. Moreover, we will never know what the Soviets have successfully hidden under Marshal Ogarkov's direction. Even more significantly, the Soviet CCD program in fact did not stop expanding in 1975, as the Carter administration claimed. The Soviet CCD program reportedly continued to expand significantly after 1975. Indeed, intelligence experts today are conceding that the still expanding Soviet CCD program is massive and is deliberate, and that it impedes U.S. verification of SALT by national technical means. Thus U.S. intelligence has now finally concluded retrospectively that, after 1975, the Soviet CCD program was a violation of SALT I and SALT II, because it was deliberate and because it does impede U.S. verification.

3. THE SOVIET SS-19

On the third question of the Soviet SS-19 modern large ballistic missiles, the Carter administration analysis implicitly concedes that the SS-19 can be classed as a heavy ICBM because it is referred to as the modern large ballistic missile issue. There are several false or misleading aspects of the Carter white paper's discussion of the heavy SS-19 ICBM issue. First, there was no reference to Soviet negotiating deception on the SS-19 in May 1972.

Soviet negotiators, including Brezhnev himself, made many false statements to the United States from 1971 to May 1972 which had the effect of misleading the United States about the size of their then-secret new, large ICBM, the heavy SS-19. The Soviets themselves considered the SS-19 to be a heavy ICBM, which it was by U.S. standards. They argued falsely that an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM was unnecessary.

Their most significant deception was their many false statements during the negotiations that they did not intend to replace light ICBM's—the SS-11—with heavy ones, the precise opposite of their plans as confirmed by events, and contrary to article II of SALT I. Article II prohibits the replacement of light ICBM's with heavy ICBM's.

The Soviets tried in May 1972 to justify their refusal to agree to a definition of a heavy ICBM by arguing that such a definition was unnecessary because both sides already knew which ICBM's were heavy and light. The Soviets said repeatedly in May 1972 at the Moscow summit:

There was no need for a definition of a heavy ICBM since the Soviet approach fully precluded conversion of launchers for other types of ICBM's covered by the agreement

into launchers for heavy ICBM's (Article II). It was the Soviet view that both sides had a clear understanding of what light and heavy ICBM's were and that there was no reason to believe that during the period of the Interim Agreement this understanding would not continue to prevail. (Emphasis added.)

This Soviet position was precisely the opposite of the true situation and a camouflage of their true intentions. They regarded the SS-19 as a heavy ICBM all along and as the prime candidate to replace the light SS-11. Hence the above Soviet statements were directly deceptive and misleading. They were a deliberate Soviet effort to circumvent or violate article II's prohibition against replacing light ICBM's with heavy ICBM's and to deceive the United States about their intentions.

The Soviets also actually argued several times that the United States could trust them not to convert light ICBM's into heavy ICBM's. In order to deflect U.S. concerns, they also suggested that a missile like the SS-19 could be banned, even as they were planning to deploy it widely as the replacement for the SS-11. Finally, the Soviets also deceptively bargained to successfully persuade the United States to abandon attempts to gain an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM.

The SS-19 turned out to be 400 percent heavier in throwweight than the small SS-11, and its volume is about 60 percent greater. The SS-19 deployment helped to quintuple the Soviet counterforce threat to the United States by the expiration of SALT I in 1977. Even the Carter administration later conceded in 1979 that the heavy SS-19 was more deadly than the super heavy SS-18, because of the SS-19's greater accuracy and larger deployment.

Important intelligence evidence indicating Soviet deception on the SS-19 was reportedly acquired in May 1972. Congressman Jack Kasse has described this evidence in the Congressional Record, citing William Beecher, "United States May Reply to Soviet Rays," Boston Globe, October 10, 1976, page 7. The United States reportedly eavesdropped on Soviet communications in Moscow in May 1972, during SALT I negotiations. According to the Congressional Record and to Beecher:

By way of example, one source noted that in May 1972, in the hours immediately preceding agreement on the SALT I pact in Moscow, a conversation was intercepted in which Soviet Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev checked with a top weapons expert to get assurance that an about-to-be-concluded formula covering permissible silo expansion would allow the Soviets to deploy a bigger new missile then under development. That intercept provided the first solid information that the SS-19, as it is now known, was destined to replace some of the relatively small SS-11 missiles, which comprise the bulk of the Soviet ICBM force. The SS-19 has three to four times the throwweight of the old missile. (Congressional Record August 2, 1979, p. E4575, emphasis added.)

S 7686

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1984

This highly significant intercept reportedly occurred on May 26, 1972, just before SALT I was signed. It indicated that the SS-19 was a large, heavy ICBM and that Brezhnev intended the SS-19 to replace the light SS-11 on a large scale precisely in violation of article II. Yet Brezhnev had deceptively told U.S. negotiators that the U.S.S.R. did not intend to replace light ICBM's with heavy ICBM's. Thus this reported intercept conclusively confirms Brezhnev's negotiating deception on the SS-19. Brezhnev knew that the SS-19 would violate article II, but he also knew that the United States did not then know about the SS-19.

And as William Safire wrote in the New York Times of August 6, 1981, "Deception Managers," page A-23:

The first hinting of duplicity came to us in May, 1972, via "Gamma Guppy," our tuning in to limousine telephone conversations between Leonid Brezhnev, Andrei Gromyko, and Soviet missile designers at the Moscow summit conference. These transcripts quoted Mr. Brezhnev talking about a "main missile" that had never been mentioned in SALT negotiations, which turned out to be the SS-19. The surprised Henry Kissinger considered this "sharp practice."

A third reference to the Beecher intercept material occurred in a New York magazine review of April 5, 1982, of Henry Kissinger's memoirs, by none other than William Beecher himself. Beecher wrote:

One of the principal objectives of SALT I was to preserve America's 1,000 Minuteman missiles by putting a cap on the number of super-large Soviet SS-9 missiles, which if equipped with multiple warheads could threaten all the American ICBMs in a first strike. In the negotiations, Kissinger allowed the Soviets to include a clause for "modernization" of all their ICBMs—heavy and light—which permitted the replacement shortly thereafter of light single warhead missiles by the hefty SS-17 and SS-19 multiple warhead missiles. That, quite predictably, has led to the current situation, in which all the Minutemen are vulnerable to surprise attack.

Nor does Kissinger mention an intercepted conversation—before the deal had been completed—between Leonid Brezhnev and the commander of his Strategic Rocket Forces checking to see whether the modernization formula would be adequate for his needs. Some 751 pages later, in addressing the SALT II problem, Kissinger brings up the troubling new SS-17 and SS-19 multiple warhead missiles. "Emerging so soon after the signature of SALT I, they left little doubt that the Soviet perception of stability was not the same as that of our arms controllers." The principal American arms controller was, of course, Kissinger himself.

This passage confirms the other evidence that Kissinger was deceived by the Soviets on their plans to illegally replace the light SS-11 with the heavy SS-19 ICBM.

Fourth and finally, as Seymour Hersh has written in his book on Kissinger, "The Price of Power," on page 547:

On the day of the summit, the National Security Agency intercepted a radio-telephone conversation in Moscow between Brezhnev and a senior military official in

which the party chief, talking from the back seat of his limousine, received assurances that the commitment to limit increases in size dimension to 15 percent would not preclude employment of the new Soviet missile system.

Hersh fails to point out that while the SS-19's size was legal, the missile itself was illegal.

What is not well known is that key parts of this reported intercept were reportedly embargoed and suppressed by Dr. Kissinger within the intelligence community, evidently in order to cover up the fact that Kissinger had been deceived by Brezhnev on the Soviet heavy SS-19 as the intended but illegal replacement for the light SS-11.

As the Senate Intelligence Committee reported in October, 1979:

It is clear from the SALT I record that intelligence of possible Soviet violation of the Treaty (s) was, in some cases, and for a time, withheld from Executive branch officials who had a need for such information.

Senator Gordon HATCHLEY and Congressman JACK KEMP have both suggested that it was the Beecher intercept above that was withheld and suppressed by Dr. Kissinger in order to ensure the Senate's advice and consent for the ratification of the SALT I AMB Treaty which was integrally linked to the SALT I Interim Agreement. Admiral Zumwalt has confirmed that this information was withheld from the JCS. The late Senator Jackson has confirmed that the Senate was lied to on SALT. If the Beecher intercept had been known to the Senate in the summer of 1972, the SALT I agreements might not have received the advice and consent and majority vote of the Senate, and the United States might have been spared the increased threat caused by the Soviet SALT I violations already planned in 1972.

The 1978 Carter White Paper states that:

When deployment of the SS-19 missiles began, its size, though not a violation of the interim agreement provisions—that is article II, caused the United States to raise the issue with the Soviets in early 1975. Our purpose was to emphasize the importance the United States attached to the distinction made in the interim agreement between light and heavy ICBM's, as well as the continuing importance of that distinction in the context of the SALT II Agreement under negotiation at the time.

I believe that in light of the Soviet negotiating deception on the SS-19, the Carter administration's reaction was extremely weak and misleading.

The SS-19 must be considered either a circumvention or violation of article II. The United States showed that it was willing to tolerate this most significant SALT violation by unilaterally redefining in SALT II the definition of a heavy ICBM to exclude the SS-19. Yet the heavy SS-19 helped to increase the Soviet counterforce threat to the United States by a factor of 5 after 1972. This was a set-back to U.S. national security comparable to the loss of the Vietnam war, and to the

Soviet offensive weapons deployment to Cuba in 1962 and after 1970.

By tolerating, condoning, and even apologizing for this Soviet SALT violation, the U.S. confirmed that it was willing to allow the Soviets to continue to upset the strategic balance to its advantage. All other Soviet SALT violations are dwarfed in significance by the SS-19 case. Yet the SALT process went on for 7 more years without challenge to its negative impact on U.S. security. Moreover, former Defense Secretary Laird stated plainly in 1974 that SS-19 deployment was a clearcut violation of SALT I. In 1979, former Secretary of State Kissinger conceded finally that Soviet SS-19 deployment constituted sharp practice.

The Carter White Paper went on to say:

Following some discussion in the SCC, further discussions of this question in that forum were deferred because it was under active consideration in the SALT II negotiations. Since that time, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. delegations have agreed in the draft text of the SALT II Agreement on a clear demarcation in terms of missile launch weight and throwweight, between light and heavy ICBM's. (Emphasis added.)

This Carter administration statement is completely false, because there was a complete failure to bilaterally define heavy ICBM's in SALT II.

That the proponents of SALT II alleged that there is an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM is of equal if not greater significance than their acceptance of the Soviet Bankfire position. There is a similar need for analysis of the definition of the heavy ICBM. One would think that the difficulties for the United States growing out of the imprecise terminology in SALT I would have demanded an exceedingly precise definition of the heavy ICBM in SALT II. It is interesting to note that Walter Siocombe declared that in negotiating SALT II, the United States had learned from our hard lessons of SALT I. He said that:

The most important lesson was to be as specific and precise as possible in drafting treaty language constraining Soviet options.

Nevertheless, during the course of SALT II we have twice repeated the most important mistake of SALT I—failure to define a heavy ICBM.

At Vladivostok in November 1974, we preserved the key SALT I prohibition on heavy ICBM's, but again as in SALT I, we did so without an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM.

In recognition of our lack of success with our 1972 unilateral statement on a definition of a heavy ICBM—and most of our other 1972 unilateral statements—former SALT II chief negotiator Paul Warnke clearly ruled out U.S. unilateral statements in SALT II during his February 1977 Senate confirmation hearings:

My conviction is that with regard to any agreement which is entered into at this time on control of offensive nuclear weapons, that we could not afford to have unilateral declarations. The trouble with the unilat-

eral declaration is that you say, "I am now about to say something which you refuse to say." So that is almost a built-in formula for disagreement, and I don't think that in the kind of arms control agreement that we ought to use to replace the interim agreement, we ought to have that kind of a situation. (Emphasis added.)

There is nevertheless an important U.S. unilateral statement in the SALT II Treaty. Again, unbelievably, the unilateral statement involves the troublesome definition of a heavy ICBM. Paragraph 7 of article II partially defines heavy ICBM's as any missile larger in launch weight and throwweight than the SS-19, but, as we learned in SALT I, a clear, agreed distinction between light and heavy ICBM's must be established. A heavy ICBM definition is thus again the key definition of SALT II.

The SS-19 is to be the baseline between light and heavy ICBM's. In order to be effective, however, the definition must have clear, specific, agreed data on the SS-19's launch weight and throwweight. Here is the full negotiating record for these specific weights:

On August 16, 1977, in a plenary statement, the United States informed the Soviet Union that "... for planning purposes, with respect to ICBM's it might develop, test or deploy in the future, the United States considers the launch-weight limit on light ICBM's to be 90,000 kilograms and the throwweight limit to be 3,600 kilograms. These figures are based on our estimates for the SS-19. The Soviet Union did not respond to this statement. The United States will regard these figures as the limits for the one new type of light ICBM permitted to the United States under Paragraph 9 of Article IV. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the United States unilaterally defined only U.S. heavy ICBM's in terms of the SS-19. But we evidently did not even try to get the Soviets to agree to such a definition for Soviet ICBM's. The above statement thus only implies unilaterally that any ICBM on the Soviet side with a launch weight greater than 90,000 kilograms—(198,000 pounds)—and a throwweight greater than 3,600 kilograms—(7,937 pounds)—will be regarded by the United States to be a heavy ICBM.

Not only did the Soviets not agree to these vital specific baseline data, they did not even respond to them. Despite this, the U.S. State Department in July 1979 still claimed:

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. delegations agreed in the Salt II Treaty on a clear demarcation in terms of missile launch weight and throwweight between light and heavy ICBM's.

This Carter administration claim was falacious and showed wishful thinking. The Carter administration advanced the strange idea that Soviet silence in the face of U.S. unilateral statements somehow confirmed their agreed status.

The State Department claim notwithstanding, there is in effect a U.S. unilateral statement defining a heavy ICBM, just as in May 1972, the U.S. defined a heavy ICBM unilaterally.

The only difference is that in 1972 we explicitly called it a unilateral statement. Indeed, our present SALT II unilateral definition is even weaker than our more explicit and more positive 1972 heavy ICBM unilateral statement.

Thus, there is still no agreed definition of a heavy ICBM in SALT II, well recognized as the major and most dangerous flaw in both the SALT I Interim Agreement and also the November 1974 Vladivostok accord.

But, as Slocumbe himself has stated: "The Soviets should be presumed to be protecting something when they refuse to agree to a specific limitation."

In 1976, Slocumbe also said:

The lesson drawn from his episode (that is, the SS-19 problem) by U.S. officials is the need for explicit and precise acknowledgment by the U.S.S.R. on even the most technical details of these issues. (Emphasis added.)

Slocumbe and other U.S. negotiators ignored their own advice in negotiating SALT II.

It is curious that the pro SALT II history of the negotiations, by SALT supporter Strobe Talbott, recognizes that the Soviets had exploited the failure of SALT I to define heavy missiles.

Talbott nevertheless goes on to describe the strange United States use of the new diplomatic device of Soviet noncontradiction in SALT II:

This rather contorted procedure, involving a Soviet lacuna filled by American "unilateral interpretation" in turn confirmed by Soviet "noncontradiction," had for a long time been a curious but common feature of the negotiating ritual in SALT... the Russians would assent by their silence... it had become a mutually accepted practice in SALT that if one side confronted the other with an explicit, unilateral interpretation and the second side did not object, then the interpretation was considered agreed and became enshrined in the negotiating record... according to diplomatic practice, Gromyko's "noncontradiction" would be considered tantamount to assent, and it would become part of the negotiating record that would accompany and amplify the treaty....

Thus the Carter administration claimed that a U.S. unilateral statement not contradicted by the Soviets is somehow agreed. This is precisely the status of the heavy ICBM definition in SALT II. The United States on August 16, 1977 unilaterally provided U.S. data on the launch weight and throwweight of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM. This was an attempt to define a heavy ICBM. The Soviets, however, did not agree. They did not even respond. The Carter administration evidently believed that this is another case in which Soviet noncontradiction constitutes agreement, because the Carter administration claimed that there is a clear, agreed definition of heavy ICBM's.

Talbott himself recognizes the danger inherent in such U.S. wishful thinking, however:

One trouble with the diplomatic device of noncontradiction is that an understanding arrived at by the silence of one party is

easily undone: all that party has to do is break silence.

Would a good lawyer negotiate key aspects of a commercial contract on this kind of assent by silence basis? Moreover, the Soviets have told us repeatedly that they would not be bound by U.S. unilateral statements, emphasizing the unreality and danger of U.S. trust in the strange diplomatic device of noncontradiction.

The significance of the continued failure to define a heavy ICBM is that it continues to allow dangerous Soviet deployment options. No launch weight or throwweight baselines for heavy ICBM's means that the Soviets can test and deploy new ICBM's somewhat heavier than the heavy SS-19. This may be the case with the fully encrypted SS-X-24, which is believed to have about the same throwweight as the MX and thus the SS-19. If the United States would complain or charge noncompliance, the Soviets can be expected to reply simply that they never agreed to the U.S. supplied baseline data on the SS-19, and that these data are in any case wrong. They could then supply their own correct data. Hence the road is open for continued Soviet deception and noncompliance.

Moreover, all constraints on testing and deploying new ICBM's, which are no more than 5 percent larger or smaller than existing Soviet ICBM's, also rely on U.S. baseline data on the launch weights and throwweights. The same is true of the data on Soviet silo dimensions which would comprise the baseline data from which to measure the inexplicable increase of up to 32 percent in silo volume allowed by article IV. But in all these cases, we have reportedly not revealed our data to the Soviets. They have thus not yet had the chance to avoid response, and it is equally unlikely that they would agree with our data.

In sum, there are significant U.S. unilateral statements and unilateral baselines in SALT II, despite Warnke's disclaimer and our own hard experience in SALT I. Dr. Kissinger conceded on August 12, 1979, in his first explicit criticism of SALT II, that the failure to achieve an agreed definition of the SS-19 was a weakness in the drafting of SALT II. Indeed, it could be a fatal weakness. How can article IV constrain new Soviet ICBM's without agreed baselines from which to measure 5 percent variances? Are we going to rely only on Soviet uncertainties about what U.S. baseline data are and on our increasingly weakening enforcement leverage?

The United States thus did not learn the main lesson of SALT I. The United States was deceived by the Soviets on the heavy SS-19 and the lack of a heavy ICBM definition. Not once, not twice, but three times—in 1972 in SALT I, in SALT II at Vladivostok, and in 1979 at Vienna in the final SALT II Treaty.

S 7688

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1984

We should not have to tolerate Soviet secrecy in SALT. The proposition that we can somehow outsmart the Soviets about the status and capabilities of their own secret programs, and then somehow induce them to agree to constrain themselves through SALT is preposterous. Moreover, as we have seen, the Soviets made many significant false and deceptive statements to the United States during SALT I and II, but because they have never been called to account for them, they have gotten away with them all.

4. SAM TESTS IN THE ABM MODE

The fourth issue discussed in the Carter White Paper is SAM-5 testing in an ABM mode. The Carter White Paper stated that:

During 1973 and 1974, U.S. observation of Soviet tests of ballistic missiles led us to believe that a radar associated with the SA-5 surface-to-air missile system had been used to track strategic ballistic missiles during flight.

The Carter White Paper conceded that:

The activity could have been part of an effort to upgrade the SA-5 system for an ABM role.

The Soviets responded, according to the Carter White Paper, by maintaining that no Soviet air defense radar had been tested in an ABM mode. The Carter White Paper concluded by saying—

A short time later, we observed that the radar activity of concern during Soviet ballistic missile tests had ceased.

This is totally false and misleading.

The Soviets reportedly tested SA-5 air defense radars in an ABM mode between 50 and 60 times from 1973 through 1976. Then from 1978 through 1983 the Soviets reportedly tested SA-10 and SA-12 air defense radars and interceptor missiles in an ABM mode. A U.S. unilateral statement does define rather precisely what ABM mode testing entails. But as in the case of article II and the SS-19 discussed above, U.S. unilateral statements need not be considered. Both articles II and VI of the ABM Treaty include obligations concerning ABM components which include not testing them in an ABM mode.

In attempting to enforce Soviet compliance with articles II and VI, the United States could have relied solely on the agreed obligations pertaining to prohibition of ABM mode tests. This was not done. The Soviets have clearly violated both these articles, as well as the U.S. unilateral definition of ABM mode testing. Dr. Kissinger conceded on September 12, 1982, that he considered Soviet SAM tests in the ABM mode to be violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty.

5. SOVIET ABM FALSIFICATION

The fifth case discussed by the Carter White Paper is the Soviet falsification of their report on the dismantling of excess ABM test launchers.

The 1978 State Department White Paper on Soviet SALT compliance contained a notable revelation. In 1973,

the Soviets falsified the number of ABM test range launchers they had deactivated, in order to come below the 15 allowed by article IV of the Treaty. The Soviets were informed by the United States that their deactivation report was false, but they have never been required by the United States to fully deactivate their excess ABM range launchers according to secret procedures for this very purpose agreed to in 1974. The Soviets thus stand in violation of article IV of the ABM Treaty.

6. ILLEGAL SOVIET ABM TEST RANGE

The sixth case discussed in the Carter White Paper was the Soviet ABM radar on the Kamchatka Peninsula. In October, 1975 a new Soviet radar was completed at the Kamchatka impact area of the Soviet ICBM test range. The Carter White Paper declared that the

location of this radar, which the U.S. identified as an ABM radar on the Kamchatka Peninsula, could have constituted establishment of a new Soviet ABM test range.

The Soviets have thus created a completely new, additional ABM test range, in violation of Common Understanding B of the ABM Treaty. The Common Understanding specified the Soviet ABM test range existing in 1972 as Sary Shagan, and the Soviets stated:

That there is a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were.

Nevertheless, without the prior notification required by the SALT I ABM Treaty, the Soviets deployed an ABM radar at the Kamchatka ICBM impact area in 1974. This ABM radar violated the Common Understanding and also article IV, which states that additional test ranges must be agreed to prior to their creation. The United States was not asked prior to the Soviet deployment of the ABM radar to Kamchatka, nor did the United States agree to it. What the United States did do was quietly reclassify the Common Understanding B into a U.S. Unilateral Statement, thereby accepting Soviet violation of article IV.

The Carter White Paper quite falsely stated that in 1972 in regard to Common Understanding B, of the ABM Treaty:

The Soviet side neither confirmed nor denied the accuracy or completeness of the U.S. listing.

This is completely false, because in 1972 the Soviets stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, and the United States had designated the Soviet ABM test range as only Sary Shagan.

7. SOVIET ICBM DISMANTLING FALSIFICATION

The seventh Soviet compliance case discussed in the Carter White Paper was Soviet dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers. The Soviets were to have dismantled 51 replaced ICBM launchers by March 1976, under the SALT I Interim Agreement. When the U.S. side expressed concern to the Soviets on their failure

to dismantle 51 ICBM launchers by March 1976, the Soviet pledged that all the dismantling actions would be completed by June 1, 1976, and they agreed to comply with the United States demand that no more submarines with replacement SSBM launchers would begin sea trials before such completion. The Carter White Paper states that both conditions were met. This is totally false and misleading, which the White Paper implicitly reveals, when it goes on to state:

Since that time ... we have observed some minor procedural discrepancies at a number of those deactivated launch sites ... As necessary we have pursued the question of complete and precise accomplishment of the detailed requirements of the agreement procedures.

These statements imply that problems with Soviet deactivation compliance remained.

There are many reliable reports that the Soviets failed to deactivate old SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM's on time between 1975 and 1980. There are also reports that they falsified a large number of their required reports on this deactivation. The Soviets thus clearly violated SALT's article II and the protocol, as well as the secret deactivation procedures agreed to in 1974. They also ignored the U.S. warning of 1973 on the need for accuracy in their reports to the Standing Consultative Commission. According to the State Department SALT compliance White Paper of February 1978, the Soviets even admitted in March 1976 that they had failed to deactivate old ICBM's on time as required. This can be regarded as a violation admitted by the Soviet.

The Soviets also reportedly brought back ICBM equipment to at least one deactivated ICBM complex. This equipment was reportedly for the mobile SS-16 ICBM, or the mobile SS-20 IRBM, which use the same equipment. It thus violated U.S. Unilateral Statement B, which stated that mobile ICBM development was inconsistent with the objectives of SALT I.

In regard to Soviet compliance questions which have not even been discussed in the SALT Standing Consultative Commission, there are several further misstatements of fact in the Carter White Paper. The paper stated flatly that:

The U.S.S.R. does not have a mobile ABM system or components for such a system.

This is false. The radars for the ABM-3, the Flat Twin and Pawnshop radars, are mobile and require only concrete hard stands for their emplacement. This system is in mass production and deployment around Moscow.

The Carter White Paper also states that:

Our close monitoring of activities in this field has not indicated that ABM tests or any tests against strategic ballistic missiles have been conducted with an air defense missile ... we have not observed any such tests of the SA-5 air defense system missile.

This is completely false. Even Dr. Henry Kissinger conceded on September 12, 1981 that the Soviet tests of the SAM-5 radars and missiles was a violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty.

In regard to the important subject of Soviet mobile ICBM's, which had not even been discussed in the SCC before 1981, the Carter White Paper stated:

We do not believe the Soviets have deployed an ICBM in a mobile mode.

This is flatly contradicted by President Reagan's report on Soviet SALT violations of January 23, 1984, which states that Soviet:

Activities at Plesetsk are a probable violation of their (the Soviet) legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II prior to 1981 during the period when the (SALT II) Treaty was pending ratification.

The SS-16's test program ended in 1976, and it has probably been deployed at Plesetsk ever since. Thus the Soviet SS-16 deployment at Plesetsk was probably underway in 1973 at the time the Carter White Paper incorrectly exonerated the Soviets of any illegal mobile ICBM deployment.

In sum, the Carter administration acquiesced in all the Soviet SALT I violations. According to the Carter administration, by early 1975 the United States recognized that deployment of the SS-19 was inevitable, even though the Carter administration conceded that deployment of the SS-19 would result in greatly increased Soviet counterforce capability. The Carter administration quite contradictorily believed that neither the Soviet activities which the United States questioned in the SCC, nor the way in which these issues were resolved in the SCC, reduced the security of the United States.

This is simply an untenable claim. Ambassador Nitze, who is now Chief U.S. Negotiator for the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Negotiations recently canceled by the Soviets, was asked about the role of the SCC under the Carter administration and the Nixon-Ford administration. Senator Zorinsky asked Nitze during Senate Foreign Relations Committee SALT II hearings in 1979:

Do you know of any violations that have come before the SALT I Standing Consultative Commission that were not resolved under SALT II?

Ambassador Nitze replied:

No, but how were they resolved? They were resolved by accepting what had been done in violation.

Thus, Paul Nitze, one of our most knowledgeable and experienced SALT negotiators, has testified that the Carter and Nixon-Ford administrations appeased Soviet SALT I violations, and covered up this appeasement.

There being no objection, the President's letter and report mentioned earlier were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

The following is the text of a message to the Congress transmitting the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements as required by the FY 1984 Arms Control and Disarmament Act: To the Congress of the United States:

If the concept of arms control is to have meaning and credibility as a contribution to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them. Because I seek genuine arms control, I am committed to ensuring that existing agreements are observed. In 1983, increasing concerns about Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements led me to establish a senior group within the Administration to examine verification and compliance issues. For its part the Congress, in the FY 1984 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, asked me to report to it on compliance. I am here with enclosing a Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.

After a careful review of many months, and numerous diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union, the Administration has determined that with regard to seven initial issues analyzed, violations and probable violations have occurred with respect to a number of Soviet legal obligations and political commitments in the arms control field.

The United States Government has determined that the Soviet Union is violating the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Helsinki Final Act, and two provisions of SALT II: telemetry encryption and a rule concerning ICBM modernization. In addition, we have determined that the Soviet Union has almost certainly violated the ABM Treaty, probably violated the SALT II limit on new types, probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II, and is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. It increases doubts about the reliability of the U.S.S.R. as a negotiating partner, and thus damages the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The United States will continue to press its compliance concerns with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, and insist upon explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions. At the same time, the United States is continuing to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements. For the future, the United States is seeking to negotiate new arms control agreements that reduce the risk of war, enhance the security of the United States and its Allies, and contain effective verification and compliance provisions.

We should recognize, however, that ensuring compliance with arms control agreements remains a serious problem. Better verification and compliance provisions and better treaty drafting will help, and we are working toward this in ongoing negotiations. It is fundamentally important, however, that the Soviets take a constructive attitude toward compliance.

The Executive and Legislative branches of our government have long had a shared interest in supporting the arms control process.

Finding effective ways to ensure compliance is central to that process. I look for-

ward to continued close cooperation with the Congress as we seek to move forward in negotiating genuine and enduring arms control agreements.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

The Fact Sheet provided to the Congress with the classified report is quoted below:

FACT SHEET

(The President's Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements)

Commitment to genuine arms control requires that all parties comply with agreements. Over the last several years the U.S.S.R. has taken a number of actions that have prompted renewed concern about an expanding pattern of Soviet violations or possible violations of arms control agreements. Because of the critical importance of compliance with arms control agreements, about one year ago the President established an Interagency Arms Control Verification Committee, chaired by his Assistant for National Security Affairs, to address verification and compliance issues. In addition, many members of Congress expressed their serious concerns, and the Congress mandated in the FY 84 Arms Control and Disarmament Act Authorization that "The President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report of the compliance or noncompliance of the Soviet Union with existing arms control agreements to which the Soviet Union is a Party."

The President's Report to Congress covers seven different matters of serious concern regarding Soviet compliance: chemical, biological, and toxin weapons, the notification of military exercises, a large new Soviet radar being deployed in the Soviet interior, encryption of data needed to verify arms control provisions, the testing of a second new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the deployment status of an existing Soviet ICBM, and the yields of underground nuclear tests. Additional issues of concern are being actively studied.

Soviet violations of arms control agreements could create new security risks. Such violations deprive us of the security benefits of arms control directly because of the military consequences of known violations, and indirectly by inducing suspicion about the existence of undetected violations that might have additional military consequences.

We have discussed with the Soviets all of the activities covered in the report, but the Soviets have not been willing to meet our basic concerns which we raised in the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva and in several diplomatic demarches. Nor have they met our requests to cease these activities. We will continue to pursue these issues.

THE FINDINGS

The Report examines the evidence concerning Soviet compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol and customary international law, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1972 ABM Treaty, the unratified SALT II Treaty, and the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) signed in 1974. Preparation of the Report entailed a comprehensive review of the legal obligations, political commitments under existing arms control agreements, and documented interpretations of specific obligations, analyses of all the evidence available on applicable Soviet actions, and a review of the diplomatic exchanges on compliance issues between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The findings for the seven issues covered in the Report, as reviewed in terms of the agreements involved, are as follows:

S 7690

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 20, 1984

1. Chemical, biological and toxin weapons

Treaty Status: The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are parties. Soviet actions not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

Obligations: The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of: microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices; and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

Issues: The study addressed whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession and use of biological and toxin weapons.

Finding: The Soviets, by maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and capability and through their involvement in the production, transfer and use of toxins and other lethal chemical warfare agents that have been used in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan, have repeatedly violated their legal obligations under the BWC and customary international law as codified in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

2. Helsinki Final Act—Notification of military exercises

Legal Status: The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with many other states. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

Obligations: All signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 ground troops.

Issues: The study examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise Zapad-81, which occurred on September 4-12, 1981, was inadequate and therefore a violation of their political commitment.

Finding: With respect to the Helsinki Final Act, the U.S.S.R. by its inadequate notification of the Zapad-81 military exercise, violated its political commitment under this Act to observe the Confidence-Building Measure requiring appropriate prior notification of certain military exercises.

3. ABM Treaty—Krasnoyarsk radar

Treaty Status: The 1972 ABM Treaty and its subsequent Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each party can deploy one ABM system around the national capital or at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are therefore a violation of a legal obligation.

Obligations: In an effort to preclude a territorial ABM defense, the Treaty limited the deployment of ballistic missile early warning radars, including large phased-array radars used for that purpose, to locations along the national periphery of each party and required that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation)

of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

Issue: The study examined the evidence on whether the Soviet deployment of a large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia is in violation of the legal obligation to limit the location and orientation of such radars.

Finding: The new radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk almost certainly constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by that Treaty.

SALT II

Treaty Status: SALT II was signed in June 1979. It has not been ratified. In 1981 the United States made clear its intention not to ratify the Treaty. Prior to 1981 both nations were obligated under international law not to take actions which would "defeat the object and purpose" of the signed but unratified Treaty, such Soviet actions before 1981 are violations of legal obligations. Since 1981 the U.S. has observed a political commitment to refrain from actions that undercut SALT II as long as the Soviet Union does likewise. The Soviets have told us they would abide by these obligations also. Soviet actions contrary to SALT II after 1981 are therefore violations of their political commitment.

Three SALT II concerns are addressed: encryption, SS-X-25, and SS-16.

4. Encryption—Impeding verification

Obligations: The provisions of SALT II ban deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means. The agreement permits each party to use various methods of transmitting telemetry information during testing, including encryption, but bans deliberate denial of telemetry, such as through encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification.

Issue: The study examined the evidence whether the Soviets have engaged in encryption of missile test telemetry (radio signals) so as to impede verification.

Finding: Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment subsequent to 1981. The nature and extent of encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles is an example of deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet political commitment.

5. SS-X-25—2nd new type, RV weight to throwweight ratio, encryption

Obligations: In an attempt to constrain the modernization and the proliferation of new, more capable types of ICBMs, the provisions of SALT II permit each side to "flight test and deploy" just one new type of "light" ICBM. A new type is defined as one that differs from an existing type by more than 5 percent in length, largest diameter, launch weight and throwweight or differs in number of stages or propellant type. In addition, it was agreed that no single reentry vehicle ICBM of an existing type with a post-boost vehicle would be flight-tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle weight is less than 50 percent of the throwweight of that ICBM. This latter provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to MIRVed systems.

Issue: The study examined the evidence whether the Soviets have tested a second new type of ICBM (the SS-X-25) which is prohibited (the Soviets have declared the SS-X-24 to be their allowed one new type ICBM); whether the reentry vehicle (RV)

on that missile, if it is not a new type, is in compliance with the provision that for existing types of single RV missiles, the weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 percent of total throwweight; and whether encryption of its tests impedes verification.

Finding: While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, the SS-X-25 is a probable violation of the Soviets' political commitment to observe the SALT II provision limiting each party to one new type of ICBM. Furthermore, even if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohibited type of ICBM, based on the one test for which data are available, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits (for existing types of single reentry vehicle ICBMs) the testing of such an ICBM with a reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throwweight of that ICBM. Encryption on this missile is illustrative of the impeding of verification problem cited earlier.

6. SS-16 ICBM—Soviet deployment

Obligations: The Soviet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS-16 third stage, the reentry vehicle of that missile.

Issue: The study examined the evidence whether the Soviets have deployed the SS-16 ICBM in spite of the ban on its deployment.

Finding: While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, the available evidence indicates that the activities at Plesetsk are a probable violation of their legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II prior to 1981 during the period when the Treaty was pending ratification and a probable violation of a political commitment subsequent to 1981.

7. TTBT—150 kt test limit

Treaty Status: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified but neither Party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both Parties are subject to the obligation under international law to refrain from acts which would "defeat the object and purpose" of the TTBT. Soviet actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of their obligation. The U.S. is seeking to negotiate improved verification measures for the Treaty. Both Parties have each separately stated they would observe the 150 kt threshold of the TTBT.

Obligations: The Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties, beginning March 31, 1976. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with predicting the precise yield of nuclear weapons tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.

Issue: The study examined whether the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons.

Finding: While the available evidence is ambiguous, in view of ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and in view of verification uncertainties, and we have been unable to reach a definitive conclusion, this evidence indicates that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the TTBT.

CONCLUSIONS

The President has said that the U.S. will continue to press compliance issues with the

June 20, 1981

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 7691

Soviets through confidential diplomatic channels, and to insist upon explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions. At the same time we are continuing to carry out our obligations and commitments under relevant agreements. We should recognize, however, that ensuring compliance with arms control agreements remains a serious problem. Improved verification and compliance provisions and better treaty drafting will help, and we are working toward this in ongoing negotiations. It is fundamentally important, however, that the Soviets take a constructive attitude toward compliance.

FUZZY ZOELLER WINS U.S. OPEN GOLF CHAMPIONSHIP

Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, I would like to direct your attention away, for a moment, from the serious issues under consideration to one of high achievement by a great athlete who was born and developed his talents in the State of Indiana.

Monday, Fuzzy Zoeller of New Albany, IN, won the U.S. Open Golf Championship against some of the world's best players. As any of you who watched the television coverage could see, he not only had the great skill and mental concentration that makes a champion but he also conducted himself in a sportsmanlike manner that represents the finest of traditions in all sports. Not only was he courteous to his fellow contestants, but he displayed good humor and friendly openness to the crowds, the media and the professional organizers who support the game.

Fuzzy began golfing when he was 5 years old. The son of Frank and Alma Zoeller, Fuzzy was raised in a golfing atmosphere. The family home was located on the edge of a public golf course, built for community recreation. All through his youth Fuzzy, the larger Zoeller family, and friends would contest each other up and down the fairways that were open to all who chose to play. Under the tutelage of his father and others who lent their aid, Fuzzy had the internal dedication and perseverance to develop his obvious skills to the highest and most disciplined level. He would play after school (some would say that he went to school when he wasn't playing golf) and in the summers until the game became a second nature.

There are reports that the reason he survived the difficulties of the wayward tee shots during the tournament was the variation on the game he developed to avoid discouraging fellow golfers who did not hit the ball as far as he did. From the earliest days, Fuzzy was able to reach many greens with one wood and a short iron, while others would have to make two drives to go the same distance. In order to equalize the game, and instead of using handicaps, the future champion would hit two shots off the tee and then let his opponent select the best. Fuzzy would then have to play his lesser shot which frequently would be found under a tree, in the long grass or some equally inaccessible spot.

These years of playing worst-of-the-balls stood him in good stead last Sunday when several of his drives strayed off the back nine when he was coming down the stretch.

Fuzzy has also had to endure back problems which are critical to a sport like golf. The initial injury came when he was playing varsity basketball for New Albany High School against local rival Providence High School. During a season game his feet were knocked out from under on a layup shot and he fell to the floor wrenching his back. This twist has been a source of continuing torment over the years but he has managed to overcome it.

After finishing high school he attended Edison Community College in Fort Myers, FL, where he starred on the golf team. Shortly after graduation he headed west, quickly won the qualifying school championship at Palm Springs, CA, and decided to turn professional. Several years later he won a major event, the San Diego Open, which made him eligible for the Masters Tournament. He made history when he became the first man to win this contest on his initial try. Over the past few years he has graced the sport not only with his great skill, but a constant good humor and bonhomie. He has offered the world a compelling view of a true sportsman and shown that civility on and off the course does not need to distract from the concentration that makes a champion.

Now Fuzzy has added the U.S. Open Golf Championship to previous awards including the prestigious Masters' honor of wearing the green jacket. Last week's contest between the Australian, Greg Norman, and this Hoosier star brought new attention to the sport. People from all walks of life and age groups were caught up in the excitement of the tournament. Many saw the possibilities of playing a fascinating game and some will be forever dreaming of making a 63-foot putt themselves. That is the great joy of golf. It is an individual sport and can be played and shared by young and old, at many levels. No matter your degree of skill, it engages your attention and you always have the challenge of making the next round better than the last.

The recreational aspects of this sport are immense and as rural and urban areas develop more facilities—there are a growing number of public golf courses in the United States, not to mention those associated with existing communities—more young people, as well as Americans of all ages including the Nation's retirees, can become players of a relaxing yet invigorating sport.

I offer my congratulations to Fuzzy for his recent achievement, for his example of great sportsmanship and for his enthusiasm and support for a game that can be enjoyed by all.

STEPHEN J. BOLLINGER

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I was deeply disturbed yesterday morning to learn that Stephen J. Bollinger, Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development at HUD, died Monday of a heart attack in Savannah, GA. He was only 36 years old. Steve's tragic and unexpected death is a terrible loss for his wife, Lin; his three young daughters; and for all of us.

Steve was one of the finest public servants I have worked with—he was dedicated to public service in a very special and unique way. He had a gift for doing his best to satisfy the needs of individuals as well as those of the Nation. Steve was truly a pragmatist, finding ways to make housing programs work, instead of finding reasons why they would not work. He had a tremendous amount of energy. The personal enthusiasm he showed in his work was, and will continue to be, an inspiration to all of us.

I worked closely with Steve on many programs which affected my State and was impressed with his compassion for people and the humanistic spirit he brought to economic programs. He also had a great ability to take complex ideas and programs and make them understandable, and, most important, to make them work.

In my short experience with him, we were able to achieve UDAG grants sufficient to attract a billion dollars of private capital which put to work more than 25,000 people who would not have had jobs had it not been for his foresight, his wisdom, and his support of those programs.

As Secretary Pierce so aptly described in his eulogy for Steve, he was a young man who gained—and earned—the respect and admiration of everyone.

We will all miss Steve Bollinger.

CENTRAL AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (CADO)

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, Central America has been and continues to be a trouble spot for the fulfillment of U.S. foreign policy goals for this administration. The region has captured U.S. attention as a result of political, social and economic problems indigenous to the area, which have severely been aggravated by external factors. The release of the report of National Bipartisan Commission of Central America in January of this year attempted to help direct U.S. foreign policy, not only to immediate needs of the region, but also to long-term needs, especially in El Salvador and Nicaragua. It has failed to take seriously a wider perspective of the crisis in Central America. We must not neglect long-term strategies for development in Central America, for these are imperative if stability, peace, and democracy are to be feasible realities of U.S. foreign policy. However, we must